Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, California by Powell, Lewis F., Jr.
Washington and Lee University School of Law
Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons
Supreme Court Case Files Powell Papers
10-1986
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara
County, California
Lewis F. Powell Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Evidence Commons, and the Labor and
Employment Law Commons
This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Powell Papers at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, California. Supreme Court Case Files Collection. Box 134. Powell Papers.
Lewis F. Powell Jr. Archives, Washington & Lee University School of Law, Virginia.
PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
February 21, 1986 Conference ) 
List 7, Sheet 3 
No. 85-1129 
JOHNSON (excluded white male) 
v. 
SANTA CLARA COUNTY 




1. SUMMARY: Petr argues that the CA9 erred in holding that 
a public employer 
plan to correct female-male imbalances relevant workforce 
in the absence of past discrimination. 
2. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW: Petr was a long-term 
employee of resp Transportation Agen employer. He 
and several others establish their 
minimal competency for a promotion to a certain position in a 
\-W ~ Loc.o\ z.ca) ~"t-\65\,> ~ Lo~ <=t3> t>4~ lj~ 
(~~<J c~
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category called skilled craft workers. Five of them scored 
higher than 70, the threshold qualifying score. Petr received 
the second highest score of 75, and a female competitor, Diane 
Joyce, a less senior employee, ranked fourth with a score of 
72.5, rounded up to 73. The five minimally qualified applicants 
were then tested orally by a committee. The committee 
unanimously recommended to the Agency Director that petr be 
selected for the promotion. Neither party denied that the 
examination process was fair and gender neutral. 
Meanwhile, Joyce informed the County Affirmative Action 
Coordinator that she had ranked fourth among the five qualifiers 
on the written examination. The Coordinator recommended to the 
Agency Director that Joyce be selected for the promotion pursuant 
to the Agency's voluntary affirmative action plan. The Director 
followed the Coordinator's recommendation and promoted Joyce. 
Petr then brought a suit against resp, alleging that because 
he was more qualified than Joyce on an objective basis, the 
promotion of Joyce instead of him constituted unlawful sex 
discrimination under Title VII. The District Court found that 
petr was more qualified than Joyce and that, but for his sex, he 
would have been promoted to the position and that, but for her 
sex, Joyce would not have been so promoted. The court rejected 
resp's defense that its actions were just(fied as an 
implementation of its voluntary affirmative action plan. The 
court concluded that resp had failed to prove that its plan was 
"bona fide" under the standards enunciated in United Steelworkers 
of America v. Weber, 443 u.s. 193 (1979), because it failed to 
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show that the plan was temporary and remedial. A permanent and 
nonremedial plan unnecessarily trammels the interests of other 
employees like petr. The District Court therefore ordered resp 
to promote and award petr back pay, and it enjoined resp from 
engaging in further discrimination against him. 
A divided CA9 reversed. The majority observed that United 
Steelworkers of America v. Weber, supra, "held that Title VII 
does not forbid private employers and unions from agreeing to the 
voluntary adoption of a bona fide affirmative action plan aimed 
at eliminating racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job 
categories." App. 2la. Under CA9 precedent, that holding has 
been extended to public employers and gender discrimination. See 
LaRiviere v. EEOC, 682 F.2d 1275 (CA9 1982) (Wallace, J.). The 
majority then determined that "[a] careful examination of the 
record in this case and of the opinion below persuades us that 
the district court adopted an overly restrictive view of Weber." 
App. 23a. In the majority's view, resp's affirmative action plan 
satisfied Weber's requirement that it be temporary and remedial, 
and that it not create a permanent bar to the advancement or 
unnecessarily trammel the rights of non-minority (white male) 
employees. 
The majority concluded that resp's plan is sufficiently 
temporary because it creates flexible percentage "goals" for 
attaining a female-male balance rather than rigid "quotas" for 
maintaining such a balance, and it does not expressly assert that 
it is permanent. App. 23a-26a. The Agency Director's testimony 
that the affirmative action plan "is a permanent part of the 
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agency's basic operating philosophy" should be understood as 
expressing no more than a long-range commitment to attaining the 
balance. App. 24a. "Implicit in the plan is the intent to stop 
taking sex into account once the long-range percentage goals are 
attained." App. 25a. 
The majority also concluded that the plan is remedial 
because statistics showed a conspicuous imbalance between the 
percentage of women in the general population and the percentage 
in resp's workforce. (Of resp's 238 skilled craft workers at the 
time the plan was adopted, not one of them was a woman.) To 
satisfy the remediality requirement of a voluntary affirmative 
action plan, public officials need only produce evidence of a 
conspicuous imbalance, and not evidence that purposeful 
discrimination on the part of themselves or their predecessors 
caused the imbalance. "A plethora of proof is hardly necessary 
to show that women are generally underrepresented in [skilled 
craft] positions and that strong social pressures weigh against 
their participation." App. 27a. 
Finally, the majority concluded that the plan does not 
create an absolute bar to the advancement opportunities or 
trammel the interests of non-minority employees. The majority 
explained that" [t]he plan does not indicate ••• that other 
employees will be barred or that their interests will be 
unnecessarily infringed." App. 28a. Instead, "the plan 
contemplates the expansion of opportunity for all." Ibid. This 
is likely to occur because at the time the plan was adopted, resp 
had plans to expand its bus fleet, thereby creating more jobs for 
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all. Moreover, it is unreasonable to infer an absolute bar or 
unnecessary burden absent a pattern of exclusions of white male 
candidates. The fact that Joyce's sex was the decisive factor in 
this case does not mean that white males will always be excluded 
in the future. Affirmative action is necessary and lawful 
because the mere existence of "opportunity" for females will not 
assure the prompt attainment of sexual parity in the workforce. 
Judge Wallace concurred in part and dissented in part. He 
agreed that the DC should be reversed because he could not 
determine whether the DC had properly allocated the burdens of 
proof and because it had not made sufficiently detailed findings 
to hold that the plan was invalid under the Weber factors. But 
he believed that the record was equally insufficient to reach the 
opposite conclusion that the plan was valid as the majority did, 
and would have remanded for further consideration. 
In Judge Wallace's view, a Title VII plaintiff's only burden 
of persuasion is to make out a prima facie case of discrimination 
in an employment decision. The burden then shifts to the 
employer to show a legal justification for its action. The 
ordinary way to accomplish this is to rebut the evidence of 
discrimination by establishing a non-discriminatory reason for 
the decision. The establishment of an affirmative defense should 
also accomplish this objective. One such defense is that a 
particular act of discrimination was done pursuant to a bona fide 
affirmative action plan. The employer would carry the burden of 
proving that any plan asserted as a defense satisfies the 
requirements of Weber. Judge Wallace criticized the majority for 
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concluding without analysis that an employer need only show "some 
evidence" that a plan is reasonably related to the goal of 
remedying a female-male imbalance, and then the burden shifts to 
the plaintiff to prove that the plan is invalid. He nevertheless 
concluded that the DC's judgment should be vacated and the case 
remanded since the record does not indicate how the DC allocated 
the burdens of proof. 
Judge Wallace also contended that there were insufficient 
findings in the record to support either the DC's conclusion that 
the plan was invalid or the majority's conclusion that it was 
valid. He first set forth Weber's four criteria for a valid 
plan, which are whether it (1) is remedial by being aimed at 
correcting "manifest racial imbalances in traditionally 
segregated job categories," (2) avoids unnecessarily trammeling 
the interests of other employees, (3) avoids being an absolute 
bar to the advancement of other employees, and (4) is temporary. 
He reasoned that there was insufficient evidence to establish 
whether the plan was remedial. He agreed with Janowiak v. City 
of South Bend, 750 F.2d 557, 562 (CA7 1984) (cert. pending), that 
to be remedial a voluntary plan must not simply be aimed at 
correcting a "manifest imbalance" between the sexes, but be 
reasonably related to correcting such an imbalance in a 
"traditionally segregated job categor[y]" -- that is, where the 
imbalance was caused by past discrimination. Although a judicial 
determination of past discrimination is unnecessary, an "employer 
must be able to point to past or present discriminatory patterns 
or practices that created the traditional segregation of the job 
- 7 -
categories in question," app. 42a, in order to meet his burden of 
proving that the plan was bona fide. While statistics may be 
helpful in showing a correlation that implies purposeful 
discrimination, "an employer cannot rely on statistics alone as a 
short-cut around the critical need for causal evaluation and 
analysis." App. 43a (emphasis added). 
Judge Wallace also argued that the majority's conclusion 
that the plan did not improperly infringe upon the interests of 
other employees or create an absolute bar to their advancement 
had no basis whatsoever in the record and was only weakly 
supported in the abstract. He also criticized the majority's 
argument that all affirmative action plans are sufficiently 
temporary so long as they do not expressly admit permanence. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr argues that the CA9's decision is 
based on an incorrect interpretation of Weber, and conflicts with 
Janowiak, because it holds that a mere statistical imbalance in 
the workforce, as opposed to a showing of past discrimination, is 
sufficient justification for an affirmative action plan. 
Resp contends that Janowiak is distinguishable on the ground 
that it involved the value of statistics at the summary judgment 
stage, in a case in which conflicting evidence made summary 
judgment inappropriate. In contrast, the CA9 carefully reviewed 
the trial record and concluded that the st~tistics established 
the plan's remedial purpose. Moreover, the CA7 has subsequently 
stated that "Janowiak does not purport to require a finding of 
past discrimination for an affirmative action plan in a 
traditionally segregated job category to survive a Title VII 
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challenge," Britton v. South Bend Community School Corp., 775 
F.2d 794, 805, n. 13 (CA7 1985), explaining that "presumably the 
employer is itself competent to make a finding of past 
discrimination." Id., at 803, n. 12. 
4. DISCUSSION: The language of Britton is taken out of 
context. The thrust of note 12 is that although Janowiak holds 
that a "competent body" must make a finding of past 
discrimination before a public employer can engage in affirmative 
action, the holding does not apply to private employers who are 
competent to make the finding themselves. The meaning of note 13 
is that when a disparity is found in a "traditionally segregated 
job category" that means that the disparity is the result of past 
discrimination. Therefore, the conflict has not been wiped out. 
The Court may wish to take the case to resolve the conflict over 
how to interpret the ambiguous language of Weber. 
On the other hand, the decisions in the other affirmative 
action cases may shed light on this issue making review at this 
time unnecessary. For that possibility, I recommend holding this 
case, like Janowiak, No. 84-1936 (cert. pending), for Wygant v. ---- ~ 
Jackson Board of Education, No. 84-1340, Local 28 of the Sheet 
Metal Workers' International Association v. EEOC, No. 84-1656, 
and Local No. 93, International Association of Firefighters v. 
City of Cleveland, No. 84-1999. 
There is a response. 
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o. 85-112 , Johnson v. Transportation Agency, No. 85-1129 
f-or 
Petitioner has been mployed by respondent Santa Clara 
County Transportation Ag cy since 1967. In 1979, when ~8~$ respondent announced an pening for a road dispatcher, Johnson 
and eight others applied the position. Johnson, with a score of 
75, tied for second on an examination given by a two-member oral 
board; Diane Joyce, the only female applicant, placed fourth with 
a score of 72.5. Like Johnson, Joyce was a long-time agency 
employee with relevant work experience. Agency employees 
conducted a second, departmental oral board for applicants who 
had passed the first examination, and unanimously recommeded 
Johnson for the dispatcher position. Joyce ranked third after 
the interview; however, the Agency Director appointed Joyce to 
the dispatcher position pursuant to the Agency's voluntary, non-
collectively bargained affirmative action plan. The plan 
established a long-range goal for the Agency to attain a work 
force whose composition in all major job classifications 
approximated the distribution of women, minorities, and 
handicapped persons in the County labor force. The plan stated 
that women had traditionally been underrepresetned in the 
relevant job classifications and recognized an extreme difficulty 
in increasing the representation of women in skill-craft 
positions. At the time the plan was implemented, none of the 
Agency's 238 skill-craft positions was held by a woman. 
Johnson challenged that Agency's failure to promote him to 
the road dispatcher position, in favor of a less qualified woman, 
solely as a violation of Title VII. The District Court found 
that Johnson would have been promoted but for his sex, and 
concluded that the Agency's refusal to promote him violated Title 
VII. The court rejected the agency's contention that its actions 
had been taken pursuant to a valid affirmative action plan, 
since, in the court's view, the Agency's plan was permanent and 
designed to maintain a particular balance in the work force. The 
court also suggested that the plan did not have a valid remedial 
purpose, since the Agency had not shown that it had discriminated 
against women in the past. 
The Court of Appeals reversed. Applying ~ndards we 
announced in United Steelworkers of America v  443 u.s. 93 
~vrc--.~1 w~- ~ OJ\k ~~.,..:,~ 
(1979), the court found that the Agency's affirmative action plan 
did not violate Title VII. First, the court found the 
affirmative action plan to be a temporary measure, designed to 
eliminate male-female imbalance, rather than to maintain male-
female balance in the Agency's work force, and that the 
preferential treatment of women would end once parity was 
achieved. Second, the court found that the plan was part of a 
remedial effort to break down entrenched patterns of 
discrimination; the court pointed primarily to extensive 
statistics contained in the plan illustrating the 
underrepresentation of women, minorities, and the handicapped in 
various Agency job categories. Third, the Court of Appeals 
determined that the Plan did not unnecessarily trammel upon the 
interests of other employees. While noting that Joyce's 
promotion had "barred" Johnson's selection for the dispatcher 
position, the court refused to conclude, absent some showing of a 
pattern of exclusion of nonminorities from such positions, that a 
single employment decision created a bar to the advancement of 
nonminority workers. Rather, under the Agency's plan, sex was 
viewed as an additional positive factor in an otherwise qualified 
candidate. 
This case does not directly implicate the issues decided in 
either Local 28 or Local 93. In his petition for certiorari, 
Johnson argues that the Court of Appeals misconstrued the 
provisions of the Agency's affirmative action plan in concluding 
that it was a temporary measure, and erred in holding that the · 
plan had a valid remedial purpose, since the Agency had made no 
showing of past discrimination. Johnson's first issue is not 
certworthy, since it involves only the proper interpretation of 
the affirmative action plan challenged in this case. The second 
issue is without merit; although the Agency did not show it 
had ~iscriminated against women, there was 
substantial evidence of the plan's remedial purpose, most notably 
the dramatic underrepresentation of women in Agency skill-craft 
positions. The Cour of Appeals evaluated the legality of the 
plan consistent factors we announced in Weber. I shall 
therefore vote 
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To: Justice Powell October 8, 1986 ~1~ 
From: Leslie VL.~~ 
No. 85-1129 
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara, CA 
Cert. to CA9 (Fletcher, Ferguson; Wallace, cone. & diss.) 
Wednesday, Nov. 12, 1986 (second argument) 
I. Summary 
Petr in this case is a white male who claims that he 
suffered unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII because 
a less qualified female employee was preferred over him for 
a promotion. Resp claims that the preference was justified 
by a lawful affirmative action plan which the employer vol-
untarily adopted to remedy persistent underrepresentation of 
women in the employer's work force. The question presented 
page 2. 
in this case is what limit Title VII imposes on a voluntary 
affirmative action plan designed to remedy sex discr imina-
tion and applicable to promotions. 
II. Background 
Resp is the Santa Clara County Transportation Agency 
and is an employer within the meaning of Title VII. Petr 
has been employed with the Agency since 1967. For eleven ..-····-· - ----......._ . ...._ 
years he had worked as a e_ Yard ~1_:.;} . In 1979, when ---petr was a Road Main~enance Worker, the Agency announced an 
opening for a A Road Dispatcher allocates 
crews, equipment, ~Inal:erials among the various road main-
tenance jobs in the County. Petr had experience as a tempo-
rary Road Dispatcher for the Agency as well as with a pri-
vate company before his employment with the Agency. Petr 
and eight others applied for the Road Dispatcher position. 
Seven applicants achieved t~e 'red score of 70 or above 
II'\,; 
on an examination given by a - a-member oral board. Petr 
tied for second with a score ot:V Diane Joyce, the only ~ /l.L-~ 
female applicant, placed fourth on the examination with a 
score of 72.5, rounded t @ Joyce also was a long-time 
Agency employee with considerable relevant 
1.. 
The applicants next went through board 
examination. The examiners un~~ d petr for 
the Road Dispatcher position. Meanwhile, Joyce informed the 
County Women's Coordinator that she was ranked fourth on the 
eligibility list. The Women's Coordinator informed the 
' { 
Agency's Affirmative Action Coordinator that Joyce had ap-
(~ ?/ 
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plied. The Affirmative Action Coordinator recommended to 
the Agency Director that Joyce be appointed. The Agency 
Director appointed Joyce to the position. 
The Director appointed Joyce under the Agency's vol-
untary, non-collectively bargained affirmative action plan 
dated December 18, 1978. Two affirmative action plans are 
at issue in this litigation -- one established by the County 
~
as a whole and the other established specifically by the 
Transportation Agency, which is the resp in this action. 
The goals and principles of the plans are similar, but pri-
mary focus is on the more specific Transportation Agency 
plan. 
The Transportation Agency plan establishes a long-
range goal to attain a work force whose composition in all 
major job classifications, established by the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission, approximates the distribution 
of women, minorities and handicapped persons in the County 
labor market. The plan notes that the long-term goal will 
not be easy to obtain, due to a number of factors. The plan 
















~~4-r.... . · 
then by major job category. The plan then provides for .5~ f-
(1) provide a guide 
to the personnel office and division directors indicating 
where there is underreprsentation of minorities and where 
affirmative action is required; (2) provide an objective 
standard for use in determining if the representation of 
,..--- ·-
page 4. 
minorities in particular job classifications is at a reason-
able level in comparison with estimates of the numbers of 
persons from these groups in the area work force who can 
,{ ~ 
meet the educational and experience requirem nts for employ-
ment; and (3) permit adjustment of Agen~ing goals as 
may be necessary because of limitations on hiring or reduc-
tions in the County work force. J.A. at 61. 
The plan does not specify that the Agency engaged in 
purposeful past discriminatory practices, although it bases 
the need for the plan on its recognition "that mere prohibi- P~ /..;::;;:v....; 
u-1/ 
tion of discriminatory practices is not enough to remedy the~~ 
effects of past practices." J.A. at 31. Specifically, the )4-v-r:....~~ 
plan notes that "[e]xperience has shown that the selection 
and appointment processes are areas where hidden discrimina-
tion frequently occurs." J.A. at 70. The plan primarily 
bases the need for an affirmative action program on the tra-
di tional under representation of women in the relevant job 
classifications, due to "entrenched patterns in hiring and 
promotion." J.A. at 65. For example, the position of Road ______.., 
Dispatcher is within the job classification of 1~ killed craft 
' 
~
. . '<\ B f . J I • t 't •h . -~2 3 8 pos1t1ons. e ore . oyce s app~n , ere wer
t')/1..0 ~ 
me~,~ 
in skilled craft positions and no women. The Agency had set 
~ l ~I 
a goal of 3 females to f i 11 55 expected vacanc es in the 
skilled craft positions during the year that Joyce was 
hired. 
After he was denied the promotion, petr brought suit 
in federal DC under Title VII, claiming that the Agency had 
• 
page 5. 
unlawfully discriminated against him of the basis of his 
sex. Resp offered the affirmative action plan as the legal 
justification for its employment action. The DC applied the 
standard articulated in ~ni ted Steelworkers of America v. 
Weber, 443 u.s. 193 (1979) for determining the validity of a 
voluntary employer-adopted affirmative action plan. The 
factors articulated in ~re: (1) that the plan was "de-
signed to break down ~atterns of [gender) segregation 
and heirarchy"; ( 2) that the plan did not "unnecessarily 
trammel the interest of the [male) employees" by requiring 
their discharge and replacement with new [female) hirees; 
(3) that the plan did not "create an absolute bar to the 
advancement of white [male) employees; and ( 4) that the 
plan was a "temporary measure .•• not intended to maintain 
[gender) balance but simply to eliminate a manifest [genderl 
imbalance." 
cant 
The DC found that~ was th t?2ost qualified appli-
and tha~oyce's gender was "the determining factor" in 
her selection. The DC determined that the affirmative ac-
tion plans did not justify the failure to promote petr be-
cause the Agency failed to demonstrate that the plans were 
"a temporary measure intended to eliminate a manifest imbal-
ance in the work force •.• but instead, were and are inter-
preted in such a fashion so as to attempt to maintain an 
ongoing balance." The DC concluded that the Agency's action 
"unnecessarily trammeled [petr' s) interests and had the ef-
page 6. 
feet of creating an absolute bar to his promotion to the 
position of Road Dispatcher." 
The CA9 reversed. The CA9 found first, "that the C Jt 1 
district court misapprehended the requirements for a bona 
fide affirmative action plan." The CA9 found "[u]nlike the 
district court, ... that th[e] emphasis on 'attainment' [in 
the affirmative action plan] does 'have the effect of ending 
preferential treatment to women' once parity is achieved." 
' Thus, it found the ·-Agency plan "sufficiently tempo~ ary." ~ 
Second, the CA9 held that to adopt a lawful affirmative ac-
tion plan "an employer need not show its own history of pur-
It is sufficient for the employer 
to show a conspicuous imbalance in the work force." Final- ....tJ . • _ , •• __ . "'-- ~..........-- ~· · 
ly, the CA9 rejected petr's argument that the selection of 
Joyce operated as a complete bar to his selection for the 
position: 
The instant case differs from W~ber ... in that it 
does not involve the admission of numerous appli-
cants into a training program. Rather, it con-
cerns the selection of one a licant for a single 
opening. When ere 1s but one opening, the se-
l ectlbn of one candidate will necessarily result 
in the exclusion of all others. Unless we are 
shown a distinct pattern of exclusion of non-
minority candidates from such positions, we cannot 
conclude that a single emplo~ment deci ~ion serves 
as a bar o r unnecessar i Ty trammels the interests 
of other employees. - - -~ 
The CA9 thus concluded that the Agency plan "falls on the 
permissible side of the line." 
III. Analysis 
A. Potential Mootness l,' 
page 7. 
Petr was promoted to the position of Road Dispatch-
er, from which he retired in 1985. Pursuant to the judgment 
---~
entered by the DC petr received all forms of compensation 
and benefits relating to the original denial of his promo-
tion, as well as reasonable attorneys' fees. Petr' s only 
poss!b~ema~ning ~ in the case pertains to ~er. ~ 
the County can obtain reimbursement of the attorneys' fees 
---........_...__.--....__----------........-· ~__......,___,-.-~,____'" __ . ...__.- -~···· ......_..____ 
and damage amounts alre ~id\._to him. Without this re-
\.._ . 
maining issue, the case would be moot. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 
416 u.s. 312 (1974) (law student's race discrimination claim 
moot because he had nearly graduated from law school by the 
time of the suit). The Transportation Department notes this 
issue in its brief but does not take a definite position as 
to whether reimbursement will be sought. This should be 
ascertained at oral argument. 
B. Mode of Analysis 







Petr has thus far pursued only 'a challenge to the ( /} ~ "JJr..-01-
affirmative action plan under Title VII. The CA9 noted, 
"Although there is state action in this case, •.• Johnson 
did not challenge the affirmative action plan on equal pro-
tection grounds and we do not reach the issue." 770 F. 2d 
at 754 n. 1. This Court has recently indicated that where a 
challenge comes to this Court under Title VII only, this 
....___~ 
Court will "leave questions regarding the application of the 
Fourteenth Amendment ••. to further proceedings before the 
district court." Local No. 93 v. City of Cleveland, 106 s. 
page 8. 
Ct. 3063, 3073 n. 8 (1986). Petr and the SG argue that the ~?& ~J 
prohibitions of Title VII should be read to be coextensive VI/ ~ G/P 
with those of the Equal Protection Clause. But, this 
Court's repeated and recent indications that the two inqui-
Wk )._.,~ e§Y v. ~..--... 
1846 n. 3 ~~ 
ries are distinct rebuts this argument. 
Jackson Board of Education, 106 s. Ct. 1842, 
(1986). Consequently, the proper analysis in this case is 
under Title VII only. 
As noted by the DC, the case which sets the standard 
for voluntary employer-adopted affirmative action plans is 
Weber. In Weber, however, the employer was a private enti-
ty. But, this Court has noted that "Congress expressly in-
dicated the intent that the same Title VII principles be 
applied to governmental and private employers alike." 
~~ 
lA/~ 






Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 n. 14 (1977). In 11I. ~ 
finding voluntary employer-adopted affirmative action plans -~--~ 
permissible under Title VII, the Court in Weber relied on ~..t..-y.-z... 
the fact that Congress intended that "management preroga-
ti ves, and union freedoms be left undisturbed ot the 
greatest extent possible." 443 u.s. at 206 (quoting H. R. 
Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, p. 29 (1963)). 
This Court has recently noted: 
Title VII was expanded to cover municipalities [in 
1972] •... Although the legislative history of the 
1972 amendments does not reflect the same concern 
with preserving the managerial discretion of gov-
ernmental employers that was evident in 1964 with 
respect to the private sector, there is also no 
indication that Congress intended to leave '' overn-
mff a ,__ emplo.,¥ers w1t e a !..: u e under Title 
V I than had been l~to employers in the pr i vate 




Local No. 93, 106 s. Ct. at 3075 n. 10. Thus, it appears 
that the Title VII standard for voluntary affirmative action 
plans established in Weber should ·~ to 
private employers. ;' Justice O'C~has 
ed this point of vie\\1-:--------· 
public as well as 
explicitly adopt-
~ 
1 Because this is a Title VII action, analysis should 
proceed primarily under Weber. Nevertheless, it is not clear 
that the constitutional hurdles for an affirmative action plan 
are significantly greater than the Title VII hurdles. First, 
this Court has not determined whether the constitutional standard 
developed for racial classifications in affirmative action plans 
should apply to sex-based classifications. The standard 
articulated in Wygant sterns in part from the view that any racial 
classification must meet the "compelling interest standard". 
But, this Court has not found the compelling interest standard 
applicable to sex-based classifications. Mississippi University 
for Women v. Hogan, 458 u.s. 718, 7245 <1982); University of 
California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 302-303 <Powell, J.) 
("Gender-based distinctions are less likely to create the 
analytical and practical problems present in preferential 
programs premised on racial or ethnic criteria."). Thus, it is 
!
not immediately obvious that the standard articulated in Wygant 





~, even under the equal protection analysis 
articulWygant, analysis would not be significantly 
A.-1--~ 
~k> 
different. Wygant required first, that a public employer "have ·~ '' 
sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that there has been 
prior discrimination" 106 S. Ct. at 1848. This element 
corresponds to the first prong of the Weber test --that a plan 
be "designed to break down old patterns of segregation." The 
second Wygant requirement is that the means to remedy the 
discrimination be "narrowly tailored". This requirement 
corresponds to a number of prongs of the Weber test --that the 
plan not "unnecessarily trammel" nonrninorities' rights, that it 
not create a absolute bar to nonrninorities' advancement, and that 
the plan be temporary. Because the factors articulated in Wygant ., 
are implicit in the Weber test, the constitutional and the Title 
VII inquiries into the validity of affirmative action programs 










c.-1' · · 1 h 't n1 as a po 1cy matter 1t 1s not c ear t at ~ 
affirrna action plans adopted by public employers should be~~ ..  
subject to greater scrutiny than those adopted in the private ~~ ~ 
sector. Public employers, especially at the county level like ~ ~~. 
the resp here, are responsive to their constituency. It should
(Footnote continued) t1 ~.,._ 
~..u-
,.,..,/~~~.-.. ~ zf..v 
~:a:~~ 
~· 
The value of voluntary compliance is doubly impor-
tant when it is a public employer that acts, both 
because of the example its voluntary assumption of 
responsibility sets and because the remediation of 
governmental discrimination is of unique impor-
tance. [It would be an] anomalous result that 
what private employers may voluntarily do to cor-
rect apparent violations of Title VII, ... Weber, 
public employers are ... forbidden to do to cor-
rect their statutory ... transgressions. 
Wygant, 106 s. Ct. at 1855. 
2. Burdens of Proof 
page 10. 
The SG, bolstered by Judge Wallace's dissent from 
the CA9 decision, argues that the~l?~r's assertion of an 
affirmative action plan should be treated as an affirmative 
defense upon which the employer has the burden of proof. 
According to the normal burdens of proof in a Title VII 
case, after a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of 
,• 
discrimination, ~he employer need only articulate a nondis-
crimina tory reason for the employment action in question. 
The plaintiff must then prove by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the articulated justification is a pretext for 
unlawful discrimination. The SG's theory is that an affirm-
ative action plan is actually discriminatory so its articu-
'-
lation does not constitute a nondiscriminatory reason for an 
(Footnote 1 continued from previous page) 
not lightly be assumed that they will adopt an employment plan I 
which disadvantages the members of the majority of their 
constituency without substantial justification. Moreover, 
because public entities are subject to public scrutiny, it can be 
assumed that they will monitor and revise their employment 
practices frequently so as to avoid public condemnation. 
page 11:-- - 1 
employment action. The SG also emphasizes that the employer 
is better able to prove the validity of the plan. This ar-
gument is not persuasive, because in a Title VII case 
brought by a minority individual claiming discrimination, 
the employer is similarly in a better position to prove that 
the employment decision was made on the basis of nondiscrim-
inatory criteria. Nevertheless, the normal b~den of proof 
in a civil case is that the plaintiff has the burden of 
~ 
proving the required elements of an off~reponder­
ance of the evidence. The Court recently reaffirmed this 
-....__,_ 
principle in the context of an equal protection challenge in 
Wygant. 106 S. Ct. at 1848 ("The ultimate burden remains 
with the employer to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of 
an affirmat{ve action program."). Thus far, this principle 
has been applied in Title VII cases. There appears to be no 
compelling reason to alter this allocation of proof for 
Title VII cases involving affirmative action plans. In re-
ality, the allocation of proof will not make a great deal of 
difference since most Title VII cases will proceed to the 
third stage of proof where the trier of fact must decide 
whether an affirmative action plan is more likely than not a 
valid reason for the employment action. The only difference 
is that where the evidence is equally balanced, the plan 
will be presumed valid. This result better comports with 














the case which sets the standard for lJ~ 
is /2-A!-./-v 
---------.. 
action programs under Title VII 
Weber. This standard contains four elements: (1) the plan 
is "designed to break down old patterns of [gender] segrega-
tion and heirarchy"; ( 2) the plan does not "unnecessarily 
trammel the interest of the [male] employees" by requiring 
their discharge and replacement with new [female] hirees; 
( 3) the plan does not "create an absolute bar to the ad-
vancement of white [male] employees; and (4) the plan is a 
"temporary measure not intended to maintain [gender] 
balance but simply to eliminate a manifest [gender] imbal-
ance.ri The Court did not indicate that each of these ele-
ments was essential, but merely that these features caused 
the particular affirmative action plan at issue to fall "on 
the permissible side of the line." 443 u.s. at 208. 
1. Remedial Purpose 
The DC found that "[t] he Transportation Agency has 
not discriminated in the past, and does not discriminate in 
the present against women in regard to employment opportuni-






The DC apparently assumed that an employer must CH q ~ 
show his own history--o-r'pur oseful discriminatory t...r  
patterns or practices. n em lo er need o make 
any such showing. Thus, the DC's actual finding ./..o ~ 
of~present discrimation against women'~ 
by this employer is irrelevant to the issue of the ~ 
validity of the affirmative action program. 
770 F. 2d at 758. ,~~· is sufficient 
for the employer to show a its work 
page 13. 
force." Id. The CA9 gleaned this rule frQm Weber, observ-
ing that in that case, the employer "did not engage in pur-
poseful discrimination" but that because of the statistical 
disparity between the work force and the local labor market, 
"the employer was justified in adopting an affirmative ac-
tion plan." Id. 
In Weber, Kaiser Aluminum and its steelworkers' Lt/~ 
union entered into a collective bargaining agreement which 
contained an affirmative action plan "designed to eliminate 
conspicuous racial imbalances in Kaiser's then almost exclu-
sively white craftwork forces." 443 u.s. at 198. Black 
crafts hiring goals were set for each Kaiser plant equal to 
the percentage of blacks in the respective local labor 
forces. To enable the plants to meet these goals, on-the-
job training programs were established to teach unskilled 
production workers -- black and white -- the skills neces-
sary to become craftworkers. Entry into the plan was based 
on seniority, except that the plan reserved 50% of the open-
ings in the training program for black employees. The Court 
found the plan's purpose to be "to break down old patterns 
fo racial segregation and hierarchy." 443 u.s. at 208. No 
explicit finding of past discrimination by Kaiser was in-
cluded in the plan. The only basis for the Court's finding 
of this purpose was that "[j)udicial findings of exclusion 
from crafts on racial grounds are so numerous as to make 
such exclusion a proper subject for judicial notice" and 
"[a) s a consequence [of this exclusion from craft unions], 
page 14. 
only 1.83% (5 out of 273) of the skilled craftworkers 
were black, even though the work force ... was approxi-
rnately 39% black." 443 u.s. at 198-199 & n. 1. Thus, Weber 
does not require a finding by the employer that it engaged 
in purposeful discrimination, but may require that statis-
tics which indicate segregation be tied to some source of 
··~ 
discrimination. ~-"' 
Although articulated in the context of an equal pro-~~ ~f­
tection challenge, this Court's recent statement regarding ../....e_ ~ 
statistical proof regarding employer affirmative action -
plans is instructive: 
This Court has never held that societal dis-
crimination alone is sufficient to ] ustify a ra-
cial classification. Rather, the Court has in-
sisted upon some showing of prior disrirnination by 
the governrnent:al unit invollve a b efore a l lowing 
limited use of racial classifications in order to 
remedy such discrimination. This Court's reason-
ing in Hazelwood School District v. United States, 
433 U.S. 299 (1977), illustrates that the relevant 
analysis in cases involving proof of discr irnina-
tion by statistical disparity focuses on those 
disparities that demonstrate such prior governmen-
tal discrimination. [T] he Court in Hazelwood 
held that the proper comparison for determining i"lMA~ L~~--l­
the existence of actuai- discri~~e [ern- \ ··~-, - , . ,-
ployer] '-¥a.,s ~~composition of ~w ~ 
[the employer's] staff and the racial composition '11 · 
of the qualified individuals in the relevant labor _ ~~ 
market.' 433 u.s. at 308. ~ ~  
~~k 
Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1847. In Hazelwood, the Court stated,
"Where gross statistical disparities can be shown, they .e~ 
alone may in a proper case constitute prima facie proof of a 
~~\ 
pattern or practice of discrimination." 433 u.s. at 307-
308. 
page 15. 
It appears that statistics can justify an employer's 
ad~tion ~! __ a~--af~m~~c:_~n ~ those statistics 
would be sufficient to constitute a prima facie case under 
Title VII. This burden of proof makes sense, because an 
employer cannot be expected to make particularized findings 
of its own purposeful discrimination. Statistics can estab-
lish an inference of discrimination without pinpointing spe-
cific blame and subjecting the employer to liability for 
prior discrimination. Title VII was intended to encourage 












establish the prima facie validity of an affirmative action
plan appears to strike the correct balance. Thus, statis-~ 
tics alone can justify an employer's adoption of an affirma-----... 
tive action plan if the statistics are: (1) based on a com-
parison of the minorities in the employer's work force with 
the qualified minorities in the labor pool; and (2) strong 
enough that discrimination as the basis of the disparity can 
be inferred. 
The affirmative action plan at issue compares the 
percentage of women in each of seven EEOC job classifica- ~ ~ 
tions with the percentage of women in the countywide work 
force, based on the national census done in 10-year inter-________., 
vals. The plan seeks ultimately to "attain a work force 
whose composition in all job levels and major job classifi-
cations approximates the distribution of women ..• in the 
[county] work force." J.A. at 54. The long-range goal is 
achieved through a series of short-range goals which seek 
page 16. 
gradually to integrate women into all job categories. Nei-
ther the overall goal, nor the goals for each job category 
are formed by comparing the women in the employer's work 
force with the qualified women in the county work force. 
e._ ,, 
However, for the ~articular position ~t issue, a comparison 
--..._, -- -- ----
with a more specific work force ~women at large may not 
be required. The position at issue, Road Dispatcher, is 
only one step up from Road Maintenance Worker, a manual 
labor position requiring no measurable qualifications. The 
position of Road Maintenance Worker had been exclusively 
male until 1975 when Joyce moved into the position. The 
only route to the position of Road Dispatcher is through the 
Road Maintenance Worker promotion ladder. Because the only 
"qualification" for being a Road Dispatcher is being a Road 
Maintenance Worker, and the position of Road Maintenance 
Worker requires no measurable qualifications, it may be 
proper to compare the women in the skilled craft position 
with the women in the entire work force. Moreover, like in 
Weber, the exclusion of women from skilled craft positions 
and from apprenticeship programs leading to employment in 
such jobs has been noted by many courts and thus may be ap-
propriate for judicial notice. Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F. 
2d 257 (CADC 1982); Local Union No. 35 of International 
Assocation of Electrical Workers v. City of Hartford, 625 
F.2d 416 (CA2 1980) Davis v. Richmond, Fredricksburg & Po-













As to the second prong of the above test, the over-
all percentage in the employer's work force is 22.4% com-
pared to 36.4% working women in the county. This disparity 
alone is not striking. Within each job category, however, 
the disparities are much more pronounced. In two job cate-
gor~s, RPraprofessional and clerical, women are grossly 
overrepresented at 90% and 75.9% of the work force respec-
..-:::.:--~ --------v 
tively. In the other five categories they are underrepre-
sented. The most striking statistic is that before the pro-
motion at issue, out of 238 skilled craft workers, none were 
female. 
If it is appropriate to look at the plan as a whole 
"':! 
to determine whether the promotion at issue is justified by 
a remedial purpose, then the plan may suffer from two prob-
lems: ~ its ~s are set by the population of working 
women at large, rather than according to the number of qual-_____.. 
------------. --~~----------------------ified women in the work force;  the overall dispari-
ty between men and women may not be significant enough to 
compel an inference of prior discrimination. 2 But, petr in 
2 Because of the CA9's op1n1on, this Court is faced with the 
question of when a conspicuous statistical imbalance can be used 
to infer prior discrimination. The CA9 coul~ have relied on 
numerous statements in the affirmative action plan to find an 
appropriate remedial purpose. For example, the Agency notes the 
need "to remedy the effects of past . practices," J.A. at 31, one 
of which is t..he "hidden . discrimination" in "the selection and 
appointment processes." J.A. at 70. As another example, the 
plan notes, as one . factor hindering goal attainment that "[m]any 
women are not strongly motivated to seek employment in job 
classifications where they have not been traditionally employed 
because of the limited opportunities that have existed in the 
past for them to work in such classifications." J.A. at 57. Why 
(Footnote continued) 
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this action only has standing to challenge the affirmative 
action plan as applied to him. the record is only developed 
as to this particular application of the plan. As applied 
to petr, the plan appears to be based on a significant dis-
parity which proves its remedial purpose. First, the 
in the relevant job classifica-
tion is significant enough to lead to an inference of prior 
discrimination. Second, as indicated above, the employer 
may not have been required to isolate "qualified" workers 
from the entire work force to create a relevant comparison. 
Consequently, as applied in this case, the plan appears to 
have an appropriate remedial purpose. Employers should be 
on notice that as applied to jobs which require specifically 
"qualified" workers, statistics which isolate the "quali-
fied" work force will be required. 
2. Infringement on Male Employees' Rights 
It is appropriate to consider the second and third 
~ 
prongs of th~ te~ether because the questions of 
whether an ~ment action "unnecessarily trammels the 
interests" of male employees o~ whether it "creates an abso-
lute bar" to their advancement are closely related. Petr 
(Footnote 2 continued from previous page) 
the DC ignored these statements and found that the Agency had not 
discriminated in the past is unclear. There is some indication 
in the briefs that both parties asked the DC to find no prior 
discrimination. Although this is speculation, the Agency may 
have been concerned about potential Title VII liability to past 
employees. In any event, these veiled admissions support the 
inference to be drawn from gross statistical disparities. 
0w-t ~~;: 1-o ~~~~ ~ 
1AJ'j"i--- ~ ~J..-V~~ ~ • 
argue that promotions are closer to layoffs, 5 ~ 
l'~ 
and 
Wygant found not appropriately subject to /--
~ 
irmative action plans. Resp argues that promotions are 
hiring goals which are permissibly subject to af-
firmative action goals. The decision in Wygant rested on 
the fact that "[w]hile hiring goals impose a diffuse burden, 






entire burden of achieving racial equality on LA-- Wttq~ 
:.......:--
individuals, often resulting in serious d i srup-
tion of their lives." 106 S. Ct. at 1851-1852. According 
to the Court, "Denial of a future employment opportunity is 
not as intrusive as loss of an existing job" and "Layoffs 
disrupt settled expectations in a way that general h.i-r ing 
oals do not." Id. at 1851. 
It appears that resp has the better argument, at 
least as applied to the promotion system at issue in this 
case. Here, an evaluating board creates a list of seven 
qualified individuals from which the director has the dis-
cretion to choose the individual to be hired. Although the 
list is created by test scores, the director is not required 
to respect the rank order. T~s, promotion is based in part ·~~ ~ 
on experience, but in large part on merit and on discretion-
ary decisions of superiors regarding the applicant's quali-
fications. Individuals must compete for promotions in the 7 ti ~ 
same way that a job applicant must compete to get hired. 
The individual has no expectation that he will get hired 
page 20. 
beyond the expectation that if he is evaluated to be the 
best applicant, he will get the position. 
Based on the theory of Wygant, it would make sense - -·--
to distinguish between 
1~ompetitive promotions"and promotions 
.... ~--- _.. 
ll \' 
which rely only on seniority. If an individual receives a 
------~~--~~ 
promotion simply by being in a position for a certain amount 
of time, then he has an expectation that he will receive a 
certain promotion. There is no discretion involved in the 
choice, and it is reasonable for the individual to rely and 
plan his life on the expectation that he will be in the po-
sition at a certain time. But, where promotions are based 
on merit and on discretionary decisions by superiors, no ~~ 
----.....__..._ --- -~--- -- ---....___ -----------
individual can reasonably rely on receiving the promotion. ------- ----....__ . ...____ ______ ·-·· -- -.......___. ---
Seniority only gives him the minimum qualifications and the 
opportunity to compete. Thus, adding affirmative action 
considerations to the other discretionary criteria does not 
upset settled expections in the same way that adding such 
considerations to a seniority-based layoff or promotion 
would. 
In the Agency's promotion system, as i~ the 
gender of the applicant is one permissible "plus" factor to 
-. ~ -::::::-
distinguish between other qualified applicants. The Agency 
is not required to fill a certain number of slots with 
women, and an applicant's gender "does not insulate the in-
dividual from comparison with all other candidates for the 
available seats." 438 U.S. at 317. The exact mechanism in 
this case is that a section director is required to consult 
page 21. 
with the EEO officer if he intends to sel~ct a nonminority 
for a particular position. This system implies that a di-
rector can consider gender along with other qualifications, 
and if he concludes that the need for certain qualifications 
outweighs the need to fulfill the affirmative action goal, 
he can hire a nonminority candidate. Moreover, the plan 
"permit [s] adjustments as may be necessary because of 
limitations on hiring or reductions in the County work 
force." J.A. at 61. The apparent flexibility of the plan 
indicates that it is less intrusive on the rights of 
nonminorities than would be a plan which established rigid 
quotas with little opportunity for deviation. 
The system 
-<::" 
as applied in this case also does not "JU; 
~ 
In fact, 
~- ?eh-; In Weber, 
create an absolute bar to nonminority promotion. 
1'---====::;::::;;:::::::::::::~~~-- -· ~ - ../ 
petr received a similar pro~~~~~te~ 
~~ 
affirmative action plan which reserved ~ the Court upheld an 
50% of the openings in the training program for minorities.~~ 
Here, only 3 out of 55 expected openings were in any sense~~ 
"reserved", and these reservations represented only goals, 
not a strict ratio as in Weber. Petr in this case retained 
his job and retained the ability to compete for any future 
openings. He was thus not completely barred from future 
advancement. He only lost the particular job in question. 
The application of the promotion system in this case 
illustrates that, in certain circumstances, consideration of 
gender in a merit-based promotion can be a permissible part 
of an affirmative action plan under Title VII. 
page 22. 
3. Temporary Nature of the Plan 
In finding the affirmative action plan invalid, the 
DC relied primarily on its finding that the plan was not 
temporary, but instead was designed to maintain a sexually-
representative work force. The CA9 reevaluated the plan and C:: 4 "f ~ 
came to the opposite conclusion. Unless an employer is re- J1~~ 
quired to state an explicit ending date in order for a plan  
to be deemed temporary, the CA9 appears correct. The plan 
consistently uses the word "attain" as opposed to "main-
tain." The quote relied upon by the DC to find the plan 
permanent appears to have been read out of context. The 
director of the Transportation Agency did not say that the 
plan was a permanent part of the agency's operating 
philospohy, but that the broader goal of affirmative action 
was. The director went on the explain: 
So the broader goal is divorced, if you will, from 
specific numbers or percentages. In terms of the 
desire to hire, to promote, to give opportunity 
and training on an equitable, non-discriminatory 
basis as part of out operating philosophy, that is 
a permanent part. 
Pet. A at 15a n. 1. Thus, the DC's conclusion that "the 
Affirmative Action Plan is a permanent part of the agency's 
operating philophy" appears erroneous. Second, the DC 
faulted the agency for having "no specific time table as to 
when everyone within the agency will receive an equal oppor-
tunity." But, employers may not legally establish quotas, 
they may only set goals. As part of the affirmative action 
plan, the agency repeatedly emphasized that even the goals 
page 23. 
would be difficult to obtain and thus were not rigid. The 
very lack of rigidity increases the opportunity of 
nonminorities to compete for position openings. To find the 
plan permanent because it does not set a definite time table 
appears to elevate form over substance. Finally, the focus 
in this case must be on how the plan was applied. There can 
be no argument that by promoting a female over petr the 
Agency was merely maintaining a balanced work force because 
the work force was blatantly unbalanced. It would only be 
proper at some later time to charge that the Agency is main-
taining as opposed to attaining a sexually balanced work 
force. 
IV. Conclusion 
This case was brought~nly under Title VII so the 
proper standard for analysis is Weber. The CA9 found that a 
"conspicuous imbalance" in an employer's work force can jus-
tify the employer's voluntary adoption of an affirmative 
act ion plan. Read in connection with Weber, and with its 
interpretation of the DC' s finding that the employer had 
engaged in no prior purposeful discrimination, what the CA9 
means is that a statistiqal disparity in an employer's work 
-----
force can justify the adoption of an affirmative action plan -- ~ 
if the disparity is: 
-- --------------- (1) based on a comparison of the num-
ber of minorities in a particular job classification with 
the number of minorities in the relevant population with the 
relevant qualifications and (2) significant enough that 
prior discriminatory practices can be inferred. There is 
-
page 24. 
some question as to whether the affirmativ.e action plan at 
issue as a whole meets these two requirements. However, 
because petr only has standing to challenge the plan as ap-
pl~, the appropriate analysis would appear to be 
whether the plan is valid as applied to him. In his job 
classification, the statistical disparity appears both mean-
.... 
ingful and significant. Moreover, the method of implementa-
tion is flexible so that the rights of nonminorities are not 
unnecessarily trammeled, and petr is not forever barred from 
job opportunity. 
In sum, this affirmative action plan appears to be a 
reasonable and responsible attempt by a public employer to 
----~ 
fulfill its obligations under Title VII. Contrary to the 
SG's assertion, the plan does not appear to be "broad social 
engineering," but instead appears to be directed at a spe-
cific and identifiable problem. ~he Court could follow the 
DC' s lead, and draw every possible inference against the 
employer in interpreting the scope of the plan. This would 
have the result of deterring employers from adopting volun-
tary affirmative action plans thus requiring minority mem-
bers to bring suit to correct the effects of past discrimi-
natio~ The intent of Congress, however, was to encourage 
voluntary compliance with Title VII. There appears to be no 
strong reason to apply this intent differently to public as 
opposed to private employers. Both public and private em-
ployers must be assumed to prefer to operate without burden-
some hiring and promotion goals. Thus, when employers vol-
page 25. 
untarily adopt affirmative action plans, it , may be appropri-
ate to defer to the employer's judgment that such a plan was 
necessary to remedy the effects of past practices. More-
over, it may be appropriate to assume that employers will 
frequently reevaluate their need for the burdensome proce-
dures and eliminate them once the remedy for past practices 
has been achieved. Particularly in the case of a county 
transportation department, presumably responsive to a white 
male constituency, deference to the judgment that an affirm-
ative action plan was necessary may be appropriate. 
A decision in this case should be limited to the 
plan's validity under Title VII, and its validity as applied 
~ 
to the particular promotion in question. The questions of 
.....__.--.-- .....__.. -...__ ......._ ........__. ) 
the validity of the plan under the Equal Protection Clause 
and as a justification for some future employment action are 
not properly presented in this case. 
~~ 
'-e 
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85-1129 Johnson v. Transportation Agency (CA9) 
MEMO TO LESLIE: 
This is ~affirmative action case 
involving the validity of a plan by respondent, a public 
agency in California. I now have your excellent bench 
memo and also have read preliminarily the principal 
briefs. In view of your bench memo, I will not write my 
customary memo to the file. 
You conclude that the affirmative action plan at 
issue meets the Weber standard, and should be approved. 
In view of the safeguards of this particular plan that 
involves both short and long term "goals", with no quotas, 
I am tentatively inclined to agree with you. It would be 
helpful, however, if you gave me a brief supplemental 
memo. As stated last Term, a majority of the Court has 
never agreed on a standard of analysis in affirmative 
act ion cases. I am told that Professor Jeffries at the 
University of Virginia states that I am the only Justice 
who knows what the standard is! 
I have written, as you know, in Bakke (that 
resolved the problem of the colleges and universities), 
Fullilove, and last Term in Wygant. In those cases that 
2. 
involved alleged discrimination against minorities and 
fixed quotas, I spoke of the need for "strict scrutiny", 
and the showing of a "compelling" state interest. You 
suggest that the standard in this respect may be different 
with respect to women, and it is true that this Court has 
not applied the same level of scrutiny to alleged sex 
discrimination that it has to race discrimination. 
I need your help in identifying an analysis that 
will be generally consistent with what I have written in 
previous cases. This case perhaps can be decided fairly 
easily by simply applying the Weber standards, but I doubt 
that the opinion can be written without reference to the 
type of analysis employed in equal protection as well as 
Title VII cases.· 
I have not thought this through. But I do not 
need or want a long supplemental memo. Also, your work on 








To: Justice Powell October 31, 1986 
From: Leslie 
No. 85-1129, Johnson v. Transportation Agency 
/eM.-;.-~~ 
~ lzh:_._-
g <0"-1 I 2y 
You asked for a supplemental memorandum suggesting a 
standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause for the af-
firmative action plan at issue that would be consistent with your 
previous writings in Bakke, Fullilove, and Wygant. 
In Wygant, you stated that the test for examining a race-
based affirmative action plan has two prongs. First, any racial 
classification must be justified by a compelling governmental 
interest. Second, the means chosen by the State to effectuate 
its purpose must be narrowly tailored to achievement of that 
goal. 
page 2. 
The first important point is that the case at issue in-
volved sex, not race, discrimination. In Wygant, you stated that 
"the level of scrutiny does not change merely because the chal-
lenged classification operates against a group that historically 
has not been subject to governmental discrimination," 106 S. Ct. 
at 1846, and you cited Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 
458 u.s. 718, 724 n. 9 (1982). The standard articulated in Hogan 
for sex-based classifications under the Equal Protection Clause 
is that "the party seeking to uphold a statute that classifies 
individuals on the basis of their gender must carry the burden of 
showing an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for the classi-
fication." 458 u.s. at 724 (citing Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 
u.s. 455, 461 (1981); Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. 
Feeney, 442 u.s. 256, 273 (1979)). "The burden is met only by 
showing at least that the classification serves 'important gov-
ernmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed' 
are 'substantially related to the achievement of those objec-
tives.'" 458 U.S. at 724 (citing Wengler v. Druggists Mutual 
Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)). This lesser scrutiny for 
sex-based classifications is consistent with your opinion in 
Bakke, 438 u.s. at 303 ("[T]he Court has never viewed such clas-
sification as inherently suspect or as comparable to racial or 
ethnic classifications for the purpose of equal protection analy-
sis."). 
Admittedly, applying the standard that has been articu-
lated as to sex-based classifications to affirmative action plans 
will have the anomalous result that a State will find it more 
• . page 3 . 
difficult to justify a race-based affirmative action plan than to 
justify a sex-based plan. The anomaly is that the stricter scru-
tiny standard evolved for race because of the perception that 
individuals suffered greater discrimination because of race than 
because of sex. It then might be argued that the State should 
have greater latitude to remedy the greater past discrimination. 
The anomaly is lessened, however, if the standards of scrutiny 
are viewed in terms of classifications. This Court has articu-
lated a strong constitutional policy of achieving a society that 
does not employ racial classifications. The constitutional poli-
cy regarding sex-based classifications is less strong. Viewed 
this way, it makes sense for the Court to treat all racial clas-
sifications and all sex-based classifications consistently. 
Moreover, it is unlikely in practice that the difference in se-
mantics will lead to different evaluations of affirmative action 
plans based on the type of classification. The difference be-
tween "exceeding persuasive" and "compelling", and between "sub-
stantially related" and "narrowly tailored", does not appear sub-
stantial. 
In sum, to justify a sex-based affirmative action plan, a 
State must show that it has an "exceedingly persuasive" govern-
mental objective, and that the means employed are "substantially 
related" to the achievement of the objective. Once the slightly 
different standard of scrutiny is articulated, then the standards 
in the race-based affirmative action cases are relevant to deter-
mine what constitutes a permissible governmental objective and 
what means are permissible to achieve that objective. 
page 4. 
The governmental objective must be remedial and must be 
directly at past discrimination by the governmental entity. A 
purpose to remedy the effects of general societal discrimination 
is not sufficient. The primary unresolved question is what type 
of evidence a governmental entity must have to justify an affirm-
ative action plan. You stated in Bakke and Fullilove that find-
ings of past discrimination are required. Bakke, 438 u.s. at 307 
("We have never approved a classification that aids persons per-
ceived as members of relatively victimized groups at the expense 
of other innocent individuals in the absence of judicial, legis-
lative, or administrative findings of constitutional viola-
tions."); Fullilove, 448 u.s. at 498 ("[T)he governmental body 
must make findings that demonstrate the existence of illegal dis-
crimination."). It appears in Wygant that a determination by a 
trial court that the state employer "had a strong basis in evi-
dence for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary" is 
sufficient to meet the "findings" requirement. That is, the 
state employer itself need not make explicit findings that it had 
engaged in prior illegal discrimination. Justices Marshall, 
Brennan, and Blackmun in dissent read this to be the meaning of 
the Court opinion in Wygant, as does Justice O'Connor in her con-
currence. 106 s. Ct. at 1853 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The 
remedial purpose need not be accompanied by contemporaneous find-
ings of actual discrimination to be accepted as legitimate as 
long as the public actor has a firm basis for believing that re-
medial action is required."). 
page 5. 
Assuming that contemporaneous findings are not required, 
the next question is what type of evidence provides an employer 
with a "strong basis in evidence" or a "firm basis for believing" 
that remedial action is required. Under Equal Protection princi-
ples, statistics should be sufficient if they can lead to an in-
ference of prior discrimination. Gross underrepresentation of a 
particular class in the work force should be enough. Other evi-
dence of prior exclusion from the work force could support the 
statistics where the statistics alone might not lead to an infer-
ence of discrimination. Any statistics should be "meaningful" in 
that they represent a correlation between the population in the 
work force and the qualified working population of the relevant 
area. 
Once the "exceedingly persuasive" justification of prior 
discrimination in the work force found, the next question is 
whether the means are "substantially related" to the remedial 
objective. In Wygant, you found that layoffs could never be con-
sidered narrowly tailored to meet a remedial objective. Presum-
ably they also can never be "substantially related" to a remedial 
objective. In determining what other means can be "substantially 
related" to as remedial objective, the standards articulated in 
Fullilove regarding the scope of a race-conscious affirmative 
action plan are instructive. The relevant considerations are: 
(1) the efficacy of alternative remedies; (2) the planned dura-
tion of the remedy; (3) the relationship between the percentage 
of minority workers to be benefited and the percentage of minor-
ity group members in the relevant population or work force; and 
page 6. 
(4) the availability of waiver provisions if the plan's objec-
tives could not be met. 448 U.S. at 510. A fifth consideration 
articulated in Wygant is the relative burden on nonminority em-
ployees. The last two considerations can incorporate the princi-
ple that "goals" are permissible because they allow for variance 
to ameliorate the potentially harsh impact on innocent 
nonminorities in certain circumstances. 
Applying the above considerations depends on the facts of 
the case. In this case, the affirmative action plan appears to 
be justified by a persuasive remedial objective. Its means also 
appear substantially related to the objectives. First, there do 
not appear to be alternatives that could meet the remedial need 
in a reasonable time frame. Second, the plan appears to be tem-
porary and intended only to remedy past imbalances, not maintain 
a work force balance. Third, the goals set appear reasonable in 
light of the number of women in the work force and the popula-
tion. Fourth, the plan employs "goals" as opposed to "quotas." 
Thus, all employees can compete for every available slot. Final-
ly, the burden on nonminorities does not appear severe. Promo-
tion goals, at least where promotions are based on merit, appear 
to be like hiring goals where their effect can be diffused among 
a wide range of workers. 
As the above standards indicate, the inquiry under the 
Equal Protection Clause is not that much different from the Title 
VII standards for affirmative action plans articulated in Weber. 
The only real difference appears to be in the "fit" required be-
tween the ends and the means. Under Title VII, Congress has ex-
page 7. 
pressed a policy favoring voluntary employer action. Consequent-
ly, the Court may accord employers greater latitude in choosing 
the means to meet a remedial purpose whereas with public employ-
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To: Justice Powell November 13, 1986 
From: Leslie 
No. 85-1129, Johnson v. Transportation Agency 
I. Title VII 
This case is brought under Title VII. Title VII applies 
the same to private and public employers. Under Title VII, Weber 
. 
is the proper standard. Weber requires that a voluntary affirma-
tive action plan meet the following requirements: 
1. the plan was designed to break down old patterns of 
gender segregation and heirarchy; 
2. the plan did not unnecessarily trammel the interests 
of the male employees'; 
3. the plan did not create an absolute bar to the ad-
vancement of male employees; 
page 2. 
4. the plan was a temporary measure, not intended to 
maintain gender balance but simply to eliminate a manifest gender 
imbalance. 
The affirmative action plan at issue meets these require-
ments. Note thatVWeber does not require findings of past dis-
. • • fWl-v--~ =;;;:::,__ _____ "'-~--------
crlmlnatlon by the employer. An imbalance in the work force is 
--.- A 
enough. You must decide whether you want to narrow Weber to re--
quire that all employers, public and private, show past discrimi-
nation before an affirmative action plan is valid under Title 
l L ,, 
VII. My feeling is that for a private employer, gross imbalance 
in the work force should be enough. Title VII was intended to 
preserve management prerogatives to the greatest extent possible. 
The chances that a private employer will erroneously adopt and 
maintain an affirmative action plan do not seem great. Public .-
emplo ers will be subject to the additional requirements of the 
Equal Protection Clause. Thus, public employers will be required 
to have a firm basis for believing that remedial action is neces-
sary because of 
Because 
necessary that 
past discr iminator..y practices. _ "· /.,..,, A-~ 
('~ ~'11M/1. 
II. Equal Protection Clause --~~ Jo ~/J.? 
this case involves ~er, it is also 
the affirmative action plan meet the requirements 
of the Equal Protection Clause. < ~ ~-";-'~' .J The Equal Protection Clause ~
standards are not incorporated into Title VII; they are sepa-
rate. Because this is a sex discrimination case, the standard of 
--=:::::--.. 
scrutiny for sex discrimination is appropriate. The employer 
must have an "exceedingly persuasive" objective and the means 
page 3. 
employed must be "substantially related" to the achievement of 
1. The employer must have a firm basis in evidence for 
believing that an affirmative action plan is necessary to remedy 
past discrimination. The focus in this case is on the particular 
\~ 
Yl job classification of Skilled Craft Worker. The representation 
...___~------~ 
of men to women in that classification was 230 to 0. The per-
centage of women in the work force was 36.4%. The employer did 
not make findings as to the percentage of women in the qualified 
labor pool. Petr's reply brief indicates that the percentage of 
women in the qualified labor pool was 5%. To uphold the promo-
tion, the Court must be willing to say that the 230 to 0 dispari-
ty was striki~n~~h that the employer could~  firm basis 
for believing that remedial action was necessary, even without 
specific findings of past discrimination and absent specific com-
parisons of the employer's work force with the relevant labor 
pool. 
2. The plan must be "substantially related" (or "narrow-
ly tailored") to its legitimate objective. The relevant consid- tJ~I 
erations are: (1) the efficacy of alternative remedies; ( 2) 
the planned duration of the remedy; ( 3) the relationship be-
tween the percentage of minority workers to be benefited and the 
percentage of minority group members in the relevant population 
or work force; and (4) the availability of waiver provisions if 
the plan's objectives could not be met. A fifth consideration 
articulated in Wygant is the relative burden on nonminority em-
ployees. The last two considerations can incorporate the princi-
page 4. 
ple that "goals" are permissible because they allow for variance 
to ameliorate the potentially harsh impact on innocent 
nonminorities in certain circumstances. 
The affirmative action plan at issue appears to meet 
these requirements. The only potential problem is that the em-
player did not gauge his goals by the qualified work force. Petr 
was denied a promotion when only the long term goals of the plan 
were in effect. The long term goal was to achieve proportional 
representation of women and minorities in all job classifica-
-;:::..... 
tions. But since petr's denial of promotion, resp has developed ~~ 
The short term goals (1) provide an objective ~:r:suh~;: term g!lals. 
V{ u to division directors of where underrepresentation exists 
Y:
d affirmative action is required; (2) provide an objective 
andard of when representation is at a reasonable level in com-
4 parison with the estimates of the qualified persons in the area; 
v, 
/ ~ and (3) permit adjustment of the hiring goals as may be necessary 
k
;,. \/~. 
due ~ - unforeseen circumstances. These goals seem flexible and 
~ ( ,\ 
and take into account the qualified work force. Al------------- "'\,__----~ '-.-- \_---·~
~ ~though petr was denied a promotion when only the long term goals 
~ wo re in effect, the subsequent short term goals indicate that 
~ fO resp planned to tailor its program to the appropriate remedial 
~ 
;r:o~~· 
~J~ III. Conclusion 
~ There are two hurdles in this case. The first is that 
the~ployer did not gauge the affirmative action goals according 
to the qualified labor force. This problem applies only to the 






number of qualified minority individuals expected to apply for 
the particular job classification. Thus, this problem does not 
appear severe. 
The biggest question f 
lit.<.. . 9 
or yeu 1s to what degree yeu want 
to modify your position that specific findings of past discrimi-
nation are necessary to justify an affirmative action plan under 
the Equal Protection Clause. Here, there is an explicit finding ----=------
by the DC that no past discrimination occurred. Under the Equal 
Protection Clause a stark statistical imbalance can lead to an -----inference of past purposeful discrimination. You must decide if 
._._--- - - "---- "'-.----~ .wt. ~ 
you are willing to find the adoption of the plan, and the denial 
A 
of petr' s promotion, justified on the basis of the statistical 
imbalance despite the DC's finding. 
As we noted, if you can get past these two hurdles, espe-
cially the second, then the promotion pursuant to the affirmative 
action plan appears valid under both Title VII and the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. 
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CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
December 1, 1986 
Re: No. 85-1129-Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 
Santa Clara County, California, et al. 
Dear Bill: 





cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
iluprnnt ar01trl at tlrt ~tb iltatt• 
Jru~ ~. ar. 20~~~ 
December 1, 1986 
85-1129 - Johnson v. Transportation Agency 
Dear Bill, 
I shall await the dissent. 
Sincerely yoursr 
Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 
.in,rtmt ~Amft .Ltf tlft ~ittb .ihdts 
'~lhulfinghm. ~. ~. 21T~~~ 
December 2, 1986 
Re: No. 85-1129 - Johnson v. Transportation Agency 
Dear Bill, 
I will be preparing a dissent in the above case. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS Of" 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
~npunu QfltUrl 4tf t4.t ~tb ~taft• 
Jl'u-lfittgton. ~. QI. 2Ll.;t~~ 
December 2, 1986 
Re: 85-1129 - Johnson v. Transportation 
Agency 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
.tnvrtutt Qfouri ttf tqt ~iftb ~tatt.tr 
'Jl~lfington. !l. Of. 21l~~~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
Dear Bill: 
December 2, 1986 
Re: 85-1129 - Paul Johnson v. Transportation 
Agency 
Although I agree with substantial portions of your 
proposed op1n1on in this case, and concur in the judgment, I 
have one concern about the opinion in its present form. 
Omitted from the proposed opinion is any discussion of the 
precise findings necessary before an employer engages in 
affirmative action. 
As it is now written, the proposed op1n1on 
suggests .that an employer need not point to evidence of even 
an arguable violation of Title VII on its own part as long 
the employer can point to a "manifest •.. • # imbalance in 
traditionally segregated job categories." Op. 9-10 (quoting 
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209 
(1978)). Although perhaps Weber can be read as requiring 
nothing more than a statistical imbalance, I do not think it 
should be so interpreted. 
In the Title VII context as in the Equal 
Protection context, I believe that an employer must have a 
firm basis for believing that remedial action is required. 
In particular, in order to provide some measure of 
protection to the interests of the employer's nonminority 
employees, the statistical disparity used to justify the 
affirmative action plan should be sufficient to support a 
prima facie Title VII pattern or practice claim by 
minorities or women. Under our case law, for jobs that 
require particular skills a Title VII prima facie case 
requires a comparison to the percentage of women in the work 
force with the relevant qualifications. See Hazelwood 
School District v. United States, 433 u.s. 299 (1977). 
This analysis is not inconsistent with Weber. In 
Weber, the affirmative action program involved a tra1ning 
program for unskilled production workers. 443 u.s., at 198. 
In that case, therefore, the "manifest racial imbalance" was 
powerful evidence of prior race discrimination because the 
relevant comparison was to the total percentage of blacks in 
the labor force. In the instant case, however, the number 
' l-
of women with the qualifications for entry into. the relevant 
job classifications was quite small. A mere statistical 
imbalance between the percentage of women in the work force 
and the percentage of women in these jobs, therefore, did 
not necessarily suggest past discrimination. If instead of 
no women in the agency's skilled work jobs, women had held 
20% of the skilled jobs, in my view an affirmative action 
plan would not be justified despite the so-called 
"statistical imbalance." If an employer is already hiring a 
higher percentage of women than the percentage in the labor 
force with the necessary qualifications, any affirmative 
action program is, by definition, "unnecessarily 
trarnrnel[ing] the interests" of male workers. 443 u.s., at 
208 (emphasis added). 
In its present form, the opinion already 
implicitly recognizes the appropriateness of this approach 
to the statistical imbalance necessary to justify an 
affirmative action plan, see pages 12-13, but I believe that 
this same analysis of the use of statistical evidence should 
apply to the employer's decision to initiate an affirmative 
action program as well as to the application of the plan in 
actual employment decisions. 
~ ' · .. 
In this case I am satisfied that the respondent 
had a firm basis for adopting an affirmative action program. 
The complete absence of women in the skilled jobs would have 
been sufficient to establish a prima facie case under Title 
VII. I will circulate something along these lines by way of 
a partial concurrence as promptly as possible. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Brennan 
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Re: No. 85-1129, Johnson v. Transportation Agency 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
lsg 12/03/86 
MEMORANDUM 
To: Justice Powell December 3, 1986 
From: Leslie 
No. 85-1129, Johnson v. Transportation Agency 
In Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 19 3, 200 (19 79) , the 
Court emphasized "the narrowness of [its] inquiry": 
Since the [affirmative action plan at issue] does not 
involve state action, this case does not present an 
alleged violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Further, since the ••• plan was 
adopted voluntarily, we are not concerned with what 
Title VII requires or with what a court might order to 
remedy a past proved violation of the Act. The only 
question before us is the narrow statutory issue of 
whether Title VII forbids private employers from 
voluntarily [adopting a] bona fide affirmative action 
plan [] • 
Ibid. This is the narrow inquiry before the Court in Johnson. 
Although the employer in this case is a public employer, only the 
Title VII issue was raised, argued and decided below. 
This Court has recognized two principles respecting the 
intersection of Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause. 
First, "Congress expressly indicated the intent that the same 
Title VII principles be applied to governmental and private ern-
ployers alike." Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 u.s. 321, 331 n. 14 
(1977) (emphasis added). Second, "a public ernployer['s] .•• vol-
untary actions are subject to the strictures of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as well as to the lirni tat ions of ••• Title VII." Local 
No. 93 v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063, 3075 n. 8 (1986) 
(citing Weber, supra; Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 106 
S. Ct. 1842 (1986)) (emphasis added). Just last term, the Court 
declined "to address the circumstances, if any, in which volun-
tary action by a public employer that is permissible under [Title 
VII] would nonetheless be barred by the Fourteenth Amendment." 
Ibid. 
Justice O'Connor proposes that there should be no dis-
tinction between the standards used to assess voluntary employer 
action under Title VII or under the Equal Protection Clause. She 
recently stated: 
The value of voluntary compliance is doubly important 
when it is a public employer that acts, both because of 
the example its voluntary assumption of responsibility 
sets and because the remediation of governmental dis-
crimination is of unique importance. [It would be 
an] anomalous result that what private employers may 
voluntarily do to correct apparent violations of Title 
VII, •.• Weber, public employers are • • • forbidden to 
do to correct their statutory and constitutional trans-
gressions. 
Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1855. But note: Justice O'Connor's theory 
as to what would justify an affirmative action plan under the 
Equal Protection Clause is stated in terms of Title VII princi-
ples: 
[I]n order to provide some assurance of protection to 
the interests of its nonminority employees and the em-
ploye~ itself in the event that its affirmative action 
plan is challenged, the public employer must have a 
firm basi for determining that a frirmat ive act1on 1s 
w~. Pu 1c emp o er -not----w-rtnout reli a61e 
benchmarks in making this determination. For example, 
demonstrable evidence of a disparity between the per-
centage of qualified blacks on a school's teaching 
staff and the percentage of qualified minorities in the 
relevant labor pool sufficient to support a prima facie 
Title~rn or ractice c a1m y m1nor1ty each-
ers o en a compel 1ng 's for a competent au-
thority such a the School Board to conclude that imple-
mentation of a voluntary affirmative action plan is 
appropriate to remedy apparent prior employment dis-
crimination. · 
Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1856 (emphasis added). Thus, Justice O'Co-
nnor would find a ~ tatistical imbalance~fici~ o demonstrate 7 
an ~ tguable Title VII violation to b su f=;'tci~:; to jus~ ify an 
affirmative action plan for either a public or private employer. 
The Court in Weber specifically rejected this "arguable 
violation" standard for a private employer under Title VII. Jus-
tice Blackmun concurred, stating the reasons why departure from 
the "arguable violation" standard is justified in the Title VII 
context. Justice Blackmun noted two ways in which the Court's 
standard in Weber differed from the "arguable violation" stand-
ard. First, under Weber, th~ individual employer need not have 
engaged in discrimination in the past. It is enough that there 
be a manifest imbalance in a traditionally segregated job catego-
ry. A job category is "traditionally segregated" when there has 
been "a societal history of purposeful exclusion of [the minor-
i ty] from the job category, resulting in a persistent disparity 
between the proportion of [the minority] in the labor force and 
the proportion of [the minority] among those who hold jobs within 
the category." 443 U.S., at 212. Second, "in assessing a prima 
facie case of Title VII liability, the composition of the employ-
er' s work force is compared to the composition of the pool of 
workers who meet valid job qualifications. Hazelwood ..•. When a 
"job category" is traditionally segregated, however, that pool 
will reflect the effects of segregation, and the Court's approach 
goes further and permits as comparison with the composition of 
the labor force as a whole, in which minorities are more heavily 
represented." Id., at 214. 
Justice O'Connor perceives both of these departures from 
~e "arguable violation" standard to be reflected in the Johnson 
opinion and seeks to have them altered to comport with the "argu-
able violation" standard. On the second point, Justice Brennan's 
clerk informs me that he would be willing to change the Johnson 
opinion to state that the adoption of an affirmative action plan 
must be based on a comparison of the employer's work force with 
the qualified work force. This is a very important concession. 
Requiring an employer to focus on the disparity between his work 
force and the qualified work force is an important guarantee that 
~e plan will not "unnecessarily trammel" the rights of nonminor-
i ty employees. It also makes the inference of prior past dis-
crimination more compelling, since any disparity would indicate 
that the employer had failed to hire a significant percentage of 
available minority individuals. 
This leaves as the only point of diseute between Justice 
--~_;~----------~~~ 
O'Connor and Justice Brennan whether a voluntary affirmative ac-
tion plan must be justified by a statistical disparity strong 
enough to support a prima facie Title VII pattern or practice 
claim by the minorities. On this point, the two sides appear 
immovable. Justice O'Connor believes that the prima facie case 
standard is necessary to protect the interests of nonminority 
employees. Justice Brennan (and the other three Justices who 
have joined the opinion) believe that the prima facie standard 
ll • 
would act as too great of a deterrent to private employers 1;.9 
adopt an affirmative action plan. The argument is that Congress 
mtended to preserve employer prerogatives to the greatest extent 
possible in Title VII. Private employers are very sensitive to 
the threat of Title VII liability, and would be very unwilling to 
admit, even to justify an affirmative action plan, that they 
might have discriminated in the past. Very strong statistics are 
required alone to establish a prima facie case, thus employers 
would often have to supply additional evidence of past discrimi-
nation to justify adoption of a plan. This would deter employers 
from adopting a plan in the first plan and thus frustrate the -goal of voluntary compliance with Title VII. The question is not 
----~~------------------------------whether Title VII authorizes the plan; only whether the statute 
affirmatively prohibits it. Thus, it is appropriate to preserve 
management prerogatives voluntarily to effectuate the purposes of 
the Act by allowing employers to adopt plans when they can show a 
"manifest imbalance in a traditionally segregated work force." 
Moreover, Weber has already crossed this bridge by way of statu-
tory interpretation and so the Court should not now interpret the 
~-­
' 
prohibitions of Title VII more strictly. 
This is a very close question. Both Justice O'Connor's 
view and Justice Brennan's view have points in their favor. On 
balance, it seems better to retain distinct standards of analysis 
tnder Title VII and the Constitution. This view is consistent 
with the Court's treatment of the standards for violations in 
Title VII and equal protection cases not involving affirmative 
action plans. This Court has never stated that the standards for 
determining a Title VII violation and an Equal Protection viola-
tion are the same. In fact, the Court has articulated specifi-
cally different standards. In McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green, 
411 u.~73), the Court noted, "The language of Title 
VII makes plain the purpose of Congress to assure equality of 
employment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory 
practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified job 
environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens." The 
Court then articulated the order and burden of proof in a Title 
VII case. Under Title VII, an employer is only required to ar-
ticulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the apparent 
discrimination. In equal protection cases, an employer is re-
quired to justify apparent discrimination with a "compelling" 
justification and demonstrate the the means are "narrowly tai-
lored' to achieve the end. Thus, the Court has consistently im-
posed a stricter burden of proof under the Constitution than 
-under Title VII. 
It appears to make sense to adopt this distinction in 
proof when evaluating affirmative action plans as well. Just 
because the Constitution stands as an independent limitation on 
public employers does not mean that that limitation should be 
imposed on private employers as well for the sake of consistency. 
Private employers may well be more sensitive to economic concerns 
than public employers and thus more deterred by a prima facie 
justification standard for an affirmative action plan. It is 
important to emphasize also that the prima facie standard and the 
"manifest imbalance" standard are not really that far apart. 
"Manifest imbalance" seems to contemplate something less than a 
prima facie case. But, the decision in this case rests on an 
--··-----
imbalance of 238:0. Approval of this manifest imbalance will not 
encourage employers lightly to adopt affirmative action plans. 
Moreover, the manifest imbalance must be evident in a "tradition-
ally segregated job category." "Traditionally segregated" im-
plicitly means a job category where past discrimination has oc-
curred. The only difference between this standard and the prima 
facie case standard is thus the link between the discrimination 
and the particular employer. Arguably, an employer could base an 
affirmative action plan on a manifest imbalance that reflects 
romeone else's discrimination -- either the union or society in 
general. But the potential for an employer basing an affirmative 
action plan on general societal discrimination is greatly reduced 
by the requirement that any disparity be based on the qualified 
work force. The fact that an employer has a manifestly fewer 
minority members than the qualified work force is highly proba-
tive of his own discrimination and looks very much like a prima 
facie case. 
There are a number of possible methods of action at this 
point. You could write a note to Justice Brennan indicating the 
changes that you would like to see. First, he should clarify ______, 
that the adoption of an affirmative action plan as well as its 
mplementation should be based on a comparison of the employer's 
work force with the qualified work force at large. Second, you 
may want to ask him to make clearer in footnote 2 that, even 
though the Court does not reach the issue in this case, a public 
employer such as the Transportation Agency is also subject to the 
distinct prohibitions of the Equal Protection Clause. See 
Wygant. Another option is to await Justice O'Connor's concur-
renee. Her clerk is very busy and does not expect to start writ-
ing until later next week, so it may be a while before the con-
currence circulates. Given your position between Justice O'Co-
nnor and Justice Brennan, it does not appear wise for you to 
write before Justice O'Connor does. The problem with waiting for 
her concurrence is that Justice Brennan will not modify the qual-
ified work force language until he receives a specific request. 
If he received a request from you before Justice O'Connor writes, 
the gap between them will not appear as wide and the disagreement 
in the concurrence will be less pronounced. Given the fractured 
nature of affirmative action opinions in the past, this result 
appears desirable. 
CHAMI!IERS Of' 
.ilt;Jtrtntt atourt of tlrt ~tb .itatts 
··htslfington. ~. <If. 21lc?'l-~ 
.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL,..JR. 
December 5, 1986 
Re: 85-1129 - Johnson v. Transportation Agency 
Dear Bill: 
I agree in large part with your exceptionally well 
written opinion in this Title VII case. I do share Sandra's 
concern that the opinion make clearer that the adoption of a 
voluntary affirmative action plan, as well as its implemen-
tation, should be based upon a reasonable comparison of the 
percentage of the protected group within the employer's work 
force with the percentage of qualified members of the pro-
tected class in the work force at large. I would appreci-
ate your considering a paragraph along the following lines 
that could be added prior to the first full paragraph on 
page 10: 
Our decisions have made clear the method 
by which a ftmanifest imbalanceft should be 
ascertained in order to justify the adoption 
of a voluntary affirmative action plan. A 
comparison of the percentage of minorities or 
women in the employer's work force with the 
percentage in the labor market -- or in some 
circumstances even in the general population 
-- may be appropriate to determine conspicu-
ous underrepresentation in jobs that require 
no specialized training or experience. See 
Weber, supra (comparison between proportion 
of blacks working at plant and proportion of 
blacks in area labor force appropriate in 
calculating imbalance for purposes of estab-
lishing craft training program): Teamsters 
v. United States, 431 u.s. 324 (1977) (com-
parison between percentage of blacks in em-
ployer's work force and in area general popu-
lation proper in determining extent of imbal-
ance in truck driving positions). Where a 
job requires special expertise, however, the 
comparison should be with those in the labor 
force who possess the relevant qualifica-
tions. See Hazelwood School District v. 
United States, 433 u.s. 299 (1977) (must com-
pare percentage of blacks in employer's work 
ranks with percentage of qualified black 
teachers in area labor force in determining 
underrepresentation in teaching positions). 
The requirement that the "manifest imbalance" 
relate to a "traditionally segregated job 
category" provides an additional assurance 
that the adoption of a voluntary affirmative 
action plan is based upon a bona fide remedi-
al objective consistent with the purposes of 
Title VII. 
As you will notice, this paragraph consists largely of 
two sentences from the middle of the paragraph in your opin-
ion beginning at the bottom of page 12 and ending on page 
13. It appears that these two sentences can be removed from 
this paragraph without disrupting the flow of the argument. 
I have attached a copy of your opinion indicating these pro-
posed changes as well as a few other minor additions. 
My only additional suggestion is that a sentence along 
the following lines be added to footnote 2: "Of course 
where the issue is properly raised, public employers must 
justify the adoption and implementation o f a voluntary a f -
firmative action plan under the Equal Protection Clause. 
See Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, u.s. 
(1986)." 
If you prefer not to make these changes I will of 
course understand. I will join your judgment in any event, 
and will say in whatever I write that I agree for the most 
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2nd DRA.FT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-1129 
PAUL E. JOHNSON, PETITIONER v. TRANSPORTA-
TION AGENCY, SANTA CLARA COUNTY, 
CALIFORNIA, ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
;;- ~f4/-d. 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT W-e. h-~ 
[December -, 1986) 
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Respondent, Transportation Agency of Santa Clara 
County, California, unilaterally promulgated an Affirmative 
Action Plan applicable, inter alia, to promotions of employ-
ees. In selecting applicants for the promotional position of 
road dispatcher, the Agency, pursuant to the Plan, passed 
over petitioner Paul Johnson, a male employee, and pro-
moted a female employee applicant, Diane Joyce. The ques-
tion for decision is whether in making the promotion the 
Agency impermissibly took into account the sex of the appli-
cants in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. 1 The District Court for the 
Northern District of California, in an action filed by peti-
• Section 703(a) of the Act, 78 Stat. 255, as amended, 86 Stat. 109, 42 
U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a), provides that it "shall be an unlawful employment 
practice for an employer-
"(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual .-ith respect to his compensation, 
tenns, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
"(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would depri"e or tend to deprive any individual 
of employment opportunities or othenrise adversely affect his status as an 










2 JOHNSON v. TRANSPORTATION AGENCY 
tioner following receipt of a right-to-sue letter from the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), held 
that respondent had violated Title VII. App. to Pet. for 
Cert. 1a. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re-
versed. 748 F. 2d 1308 (1984); modified, 770 F. 2d 752 




In December 1978, the Santa Clara County Transit District 
Board of Supervisors adopted an Affirmative Action Plan 
(Plan) for the County Transportation Agency. The Plan im-
plemented a County Affirmative Action Plan, which had been 
adopted, declared the County, because "mere prohibition of 
discriminatory practices is not enough to remedy the effects 
of past practices and to permit attainment of an equitable 
representation of minorities, women and handicapped per-
sons." App. 31. 3 Relevant to this case, the Agency Plan 
provides that, in making promotions to positions within a tra-
ditionally segregated job classification in which women have 
been significantly underrepresented, the Agency is author-
ized to consider as one factor the sex of a qualified applicant. 
In reviewing the composition of its work force, the Agency 
noted in its Plan that women were represented in numbers 
far less than their proportion of the county labor force in both 
the Agency as a whole and in five of seven job categories. 
t No constitutional issue was either raised or addressed in the litigation 
below. See 748 F. 2d 1308, 1310, n. 1 (1984). We therefore decide in this 
case only the issue of the prohibitory scope of Title VII. Of course, where [ · 
the issue is properly raised, public employers must justify the adaption and 
implementation of a voluntary affirmative action plan under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. See Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,- U.S. 
-(1986). 
• The Plan reaffirmed earlier County and Agency efforts to address the 
issue of employment discrimination, dating back to the County's adoption 
in 1971 of an Equal Employment Opportunity Policy. App. 37-40. 
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Specifically, while women constituted 36.4% of the area labor 
market, they composed only 22.4% of Agency employees. 
Furthermore, women working at the Agency were concen-
trated largely in EEOC job categories traditionally held by 
women: women made up 76% of Office and Clerical Workers, 
but only 7.1% of Agency Officials and Administrators, 8.6% 
of Professionals, 9. 7% of Technicians, and 22% of Service and 
Maintenance workers. As for the job classification relevant 
to this case, none of the 238 Skilled Craft Worker positions 
was held by a woman. !d., at 49. The Plan noted that this 
underrepresentation of women in part reflected the fact that 
women had not traditionally been employed in these posi-
tions, and that they had not been strongly motivated to seek 
training or employment in them "because of the limited 
opportunities that have existed in the past for them to work 
in such classifications." !d., at 57. The Plan also observed 
that, while the proportion of ethnic minorities in the Agency 
as a whole exceeded the proportion of such minorities in the 
county work force, a smaller percentage of minority employ-
ees held management, professional, and technical positions. 4 
The Agency stated that its Plan was intended to achieve "a 
statistically measurable yearly improvement in hiring, train-
ing and promotion of minorities and women throughout the 
Agency in all major job classifications where they are under-
represented." I d., at 43. As a benchmark by which to eval-
uate progress, the Agency stated that its long-term goal was 
to attain a work force whose composition reflected the pro-
portion of minorities and women in the area labor force. I d., 
at 54. Thus, for the Skilled Craft category in which the road 
dispatcher position at issue here was classified, the Agency's 
aspiration was that eventually about 36% of the jobs would be 
occupied by women. 
• While minorities constituted 19.7% of the county labor force, they rep-
resented 7.1% of the Agency's Officials and Administrators, 19% of its Pro-
fessionals, and 16.9% of its Technicians. /d., at 48. 
'\ 
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The Plan acknowledged that a number of factors might 
make it unrealistic to rely on the Agency's long-term goals in 
evaluating the Agency's progress in expanding job opportuni-
ties for minorities and women. Among the factors identified 
were low turnover rates in some classifications, the fact that 
some jobs involved heavy labor, the small number of posi-
tions within some job categories, the limited number of entry 
positions leading to the Technical and Skilled Craft classifica-
tions, and the limited number of minorities and women quali-
fied for positions requiring specialized training and experi-
ence. !d., at 56-57. As a result, the Plan counselled that 
short-range goals be established and annually adjusted to 
serve as the most realistic guide for actual employment deci-
sions. Among the tasks identified as important in establish-
ing such short-term goals was the acquisition of data ''reflect-
ing the ratio of minorities, women and handicapped persons 
who are working in the local area in major job classifications 
relating to those utilized by the County Administration," so 
as to determine the availability of members of such groups 
who "possess the desired qualifications or potential for place-
ment." !d., at 64. These data on qualified group members, 
along with predictions of position vacancies, were to serve as 
the basis for "realistic yearly employment goals for women, 
minorities and handicapped persons in each EEOC job cate-
gory and major job classification." Ibid. 
The Agency's Plan thus set aside no specific number of po-
sitions for minorities or women, but authorized the consider-
ation of ethnicity or sex as a factor when evaluating qualified 
candidates for jobs in which members of such groups were 
poorly represented. One such job was the road dispatcher 
position that is the subject of the dispute in this case. 
B 
On December 12, 1979, the Agency announced a vacancy 
for the promotional position of road dispatcher in the Agen-
cy's Roads Division. Dispatchers assign road crews, equip-
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ment, and materials, and maintain records pertaining to road 
maintenance jobs. I d., at 23-24. The position requires at 
minimum four years of dispatch or road maintenance work 
experience for Santa Clara County. The EEOC job classifi-
cation scheme designates a road dispatcher as a Skilled Craft 
worker. 
Twelve County employees applied for the promotion, in-
cluding Joyce and Johnson. Joyce had worked for the 
County since 1970, serving as an account clerk until 1975. 
She had applied for a road dispatcher position in 1974, but 
was deemed ineligible because she had not served as a road 
maintenance worker. In 1975, Joyce transferred from a se-
nior account clerk position to a road maintenance worker po-
sition, becoming the first woman to fill such a job. Tr. 
83-84. During her four years in that position, she occasion-
ally worked out of class as a road dispatcher. 
Petitioner Johnson began with the county in 1967 as a road 
yard clerk, after private employment that included working 
as a supervisor and dispatcher. He had also unsuccessfully 
applied for the road dispatcher opening in 1974. In 1977, his 
clerical position was downgraded, and he sought and received 
a transfer to the position of road maintenance worker. !d., 
at 127. He also occasionally worked out of class as a dis-
patcher while performing that job. 
Nine of the applicants, including Joyce and Johnson, were 
deemed qualified for the job, and were interviewed by a two-
person board. Seven of the applicants scored above 70 on 
this interview, which meant that they were certified as eligi-
ble for selection by the appointing authority. The scores 
awarded ranged from 70 to 80. Johnson was tied for second 
with score of 75, while Joyce ranked next with a score of 73. 
A second interview was conducted by three Agency supervi-
sors, who ultimately recommended that Johnson be pro-
moted. Prior to the second interview, Joyce had contacted 
the County's Affirmative Action Office because she feared 
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that her application might not receive disinterested review. 5 
The Office in turn contacted the Agency's Affirmative Action 
Coordinator, whom the Agency's Plan makes responsible for, 
inter alia, keeping the Director informed of opportunities for 
the Agency to accomplish its objectives under the Plan. At 
the time, the Agency employed no women in any Skilled 
Craft position, and had never employed a woman as a road 
dispatcher. The Coordinator recommended to the Director 
of the Agency, James Graebner, that Joyce be promoted. 
Graebner, authorized to choose any of the seven persons 
deemed eligible, thus had the benefit of suggestions by the 
second interview panel and by the Agency Coordinator in ar-
riving at his decision. Mter deliberation, Graebner con-
cluded that the promotion should be given to Joyce. As he 
testified: "I tried to look at the whole picture, the combina-
tion of her qualifications and Mr. Johnson's qualifications, 
their test scores, their expertise, their background, affirma-
& Joyce testified that she had had disagreements \\;th two of the three 
members of the second interview panel. One had been her first supervisor 
when she began work as a road maintenance worker. In performing ardu-
ous work in this job, she had not been issued coveralls, although her male 
co-workers had received them. After ruining her pants, she complained 
to her supervisor, to no avail. After three other similar incidents, ruining 
clothes on each occasion, she filed a grievance, and was issued four pair of 
coveralls the next day. Tr. 89-90. Joyce had dealt with a second member 
of the panel for a year and a half in her capacity as chair of the Roads Oper-
ations Safety Committee, where she and he "had several differences of 
opinion on how safety should be implemented." /d., at 90-91. In addi-
tion, Joyce testified that she had infonned the person responsible for ar-
ranging her second interview that she had a disaster preparedness class on 
a certain day the following week. By this time about ten days had passed 
since she had notified this person of her availability, and no date had yet 
been set for the interview. Within a day or two after this conversation, 
however, she received a notice setting her interview at a time directly in 
the middle of her disaster preparedness class. /d., at 94-95. This same \ 
panel member had earlier described Joyce as a "rebel-rousing, skirt-wear-
ing person," Tr. 153. 
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tive action matters, things like that ... I believe it was a 
combination of all those." I d., at 68. 
The certification form naming Joyce as the person pro-
moted to the dispatcher position stated that both she and 
Johnson were rated as well-qualified for the job. The eval-
uation of Joyce read: "Well qualified by virtue of 18 years of 
past clerical experience including 3Y2 years at West Yard plus 
almost 5 years as a [road maintenance worker]." App. 27. 
The evaluation of Johnson was as follows: 'Well qualified ap-
plicant; two years of [road maintenance worker] experience 
plus 11 years of Road Yard Clerk. Has had previous outside 
Dispatch experience but was 13 years ago." Ibid. 
Graebner testified that he did not regard as significant the 
fact that Johnson scored 75 and Joyce 73 when interviewed 
by the two-person board. Tr. 57-58. 
Petitioner Johnson filed a complaint with the EEOC alleg-
ing that he had been denied promotion on the basis of sex in 
violation of Title VII. He received a right-to-sue letter from 
the agency on March 10, 1981, and on March 20, 1981, filed 
suit in the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California. The District Court found that Johnson 
was more qualified for the dispatcher position than Joyce, 
and that the sex of Joyce was the "determining factor in her 
selection." App. to Pet. for Cert. 4a (emphasis in original). 
The court acknowledged that, since the Agency justified its 
decision on the basis of its Affirmative Action Plan, the crite-
ria announced in Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193 (1979), 
should be applied. App. to Pet. for Cert. 5a. It then found 
the Agency's Plan invalid on the ground that the evidence did 
not satisfy Weber's criterion that the Plan be temporary. 
App. to Pet. for Cert. 6a. The Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the absence of an ex-
press termination date in the Plan was not dispositive, since 
the Plan repeatedly expressed its objective as the attain-
ment, rather than the maintenance, of a work force mirroring 
the labor force in the county. 748 F. 2d, at 1312, modified, 
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770 F. 2d 752 (1985). The Court of Appeals added that the 
fact that the Plan established no fixed percentage of positions 
for minorities or women made it less essential that the Plan 
contain a relatively explicit deadline. 748 F. 2d, at 1312. 
The Court held further that the Agency's consideration of 
Joyce's sex in filling the road dispatcher position was lawful. 
The Agency Plan had been adopted, the court said, to ad-
dress a conspicuous imbalance in the Agency's work force, 
and neither unnecessarily trammeled the rights of other em-
ployees, nor created an absolute bar to their advancement. 
/d., at 1313-1314. 
II 
As a preliminary matter, we note that petitioner bears the 
burden of establishing the invalidity of the Agency's Plan. 
Only last term in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 
476 U. S. --,- (1986), we held that "[t]he ultimate bur-
den remains with the employees to demonstrate the uncon-
stitutionality of an affirmative-action program," and we see 
no basis for a different rule regarding a plan's alleged viola-
tion of Title VII. This case also fits readily within the an-
alytical framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973). Once a plaintiff establishes a 
prima facie case that race or sex has been taken into account 
in an employer's employment decision, the burden shifts to 
the employer to articulate a nondiscriminatory rationale for 
its decision. The existence of an affirmative action plan pro-
vides such a rationale. If such a plan is articulated as the 
basis for the employer's decision, the burden shifts to the 
plaintiff to prove that the plan is invalid and the employer's 
justification is pretextual. As a practical matter, of course, 
an employer will generally seek to avoid a charge of pretext 
by presenting evidence in support of its plan. That does not 
mean, however, as petitioner suggests, that reliance on an af-
firmative action plan is to be treated as an affirmative de-
fense requiring the employer to carry the burden of proving 
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the validity of the plan. The burden of proving its invalidity 
remains on the plaintiff. 
The assessment of the legality of the Agency Plan must be 
guided by our decision in Weber, supra. In that case, the 
Court addressed the question whether the employer violated 
Title VII by adopting a voluntary affirmative action plan de-
signed to "eliminate manifest racial imbalances in tradition-
ally segregated job categories." Id., at 197. The respond-
ent employee in that case challenged the employer's denial of 
his application for a position in a newly established craft 
training program, contending that the employer's selection 
process impermissibly took into account the race of the appli-
cants. The selection process was guided by an affirmative 
action plan, which provided that 50% of the new trainees 
were to be black until the percentage of black skilled 
craftworkers in the employer's plant approximated the per-
centage of blacks in the local labor force. Adoption of the 
plan had been prompted by the fact that only 5 of 273, or 
1.83%, of skilled craftworkers at the plant were black, even 
though the work force in the area was approximately 39% 
black. Because of the historical exclusion of blacks from 
craft positions, the employer regarded its former policy of 
hiring trained outsiders as inadequate to redress the imbal-
ance in its work force. 
We upheld the employer's decision to select less senior 
black applicants over the white respondent, for we found that 
taking race into account was consistent with Title VII's ob-
jective of "break[ing] down old patterns of racial segregation 
and hierarchy." I d., at 208. We noted that the plan did not 
"unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white employ-
ees," since it did not require "the discharge of white workers 
and their replacement with new black hirees." Ibid. Nor 
did the plan create "an absolute bar to the advancement of 
white employees," since half of those trained in the new pro-
gram were to be white. Ibid. Finally, we observed that 
the plan was a temporary measure, not designed to maintain 
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racial balance, but to "eliminate a manifest racial imbalance." 
Ibid. As JUSTICE BLACKMUN's concurrence made clear, 
Weber held that an employer seeking to justify the adoption 
of a plan need not point to its own prior discriminatory prac-
tices, nor even to evidence of an "arguable violation" on its 
part. I d., at 212. Rather, it need point only to a "conspicu-
ous . . . imbalance in traditionally segregated job catego-
ries." I d., at 209. Our decision was grounded on the recog-
nition that voluntary employer action can play a crucial role 
in furthering Title VII's purpose of eliminating the effects of 
discrimination in the workplace, and that Title VII should not 
be read to thwart such efforts. I d., at 204. 
In reviewing the employment decision at issue in this case, 
we must first examine whether that decision was made pur-
suant to a plan prompted by concerns similar to those of the 
employer in Weber. Next, we must determine whether the 
effect of the plan on males and non-minorities is comparable 
to the effect of the plan in that case. The first issue is there-
fore whether consideration of the sex of applicants for skilled 
craft jobs was justified by the existence of a "manifest imbal-
ance" that reflected underrepresentation of women in "tradi-
tionally segregated job categories." Id., at 197. In deter-
mining whether an imbalance exists that would justify taking 
sex or race into account, a comparison of the percentage of 
minorities or women in the employer's work force with the 
percentage in the area labor market or general population is 
appropriate in analyzing jobs that require no special exper-
tise, see Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324 (1977) 
(comparison between percentage of blacks in employer's 
work force and in general population proper in determining 
extent of imbalance in truck driving positions), or training 
programs designed to provide expertise, see Weber, supra 
(comparison between proportion of blacks working at plant 
and proportion of blacks in area labor force appropriate in cal-
culating imbalance for purpose of establishing preferential 
admission to craft training program). Where a job requires 
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special training, however, the comparison should be with 
those in the labor force who possess the relevant qualifica-
tions. See Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 
U. S. 299 (1977) (must compare percentage of blacks in em-
ployer's work ranks with percentage of qualified black teach-
ers in area labor force in determining underrepresentation in 
teaching positions). The requirement that the "manifest im-
balance" relate to a "traditionally segregated job category" 
provides assurance that sex or race will be taken into account 
in a manner consistent with Title VII's purpose of eliminating 
the effects of employment discrimination. 
It is clear that the decision to hire Joyce was made pursu-
ant to an Agency plan that directed that sex or race by taken 
into account for the purpose of remedying this type of under-
representation. The Agency Plan acknowledged the "lim-
ited opportunities that have existed in the past," App. 57, for 
women to find employment in certain job classifications 
"where women have not been traditionally employed in sig-
nificant numbers." ld., at 51. 6 As a result, observed the 
Plan, women were concentrated in traditionally female jobs 
in the Agency, and represented a lower percentage in other 
job classifications than would be expected if such traditional 
segregation had not occurred. Specifically, 9 of the 10 Para-
Professionals and 110 of the 145 Office and Clerical Workers 
'For instance, the description of the Skilled Craft Worker category, in 
which the road dispatcher position is located, is as follows: 
"Occupations in which workers perfonn jobs which require special man-
ual skill and a thorough and comprehensive knowledge of the process in-
volved in the work which is acquired through on-the-job training and ex-
perience or through apprenticeship or other fonnal training programs. 
Includes: mechanics and repairmen; electricians, heavy equipment oper-
ators, stationary engineers, skilled machining occupations, carpenters, 
compositors and typesetters and kindred workers." App. 108. 
~the Court of Appeals said in its decision below, "A plethora of proof is 
hardly necessary to show that women are generally underrepresented in 
such positions and that strong social pressures weigh against their partici-
pation." 748 F. 2d, at 1313. 
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were women. By contrast, women were only 2 of the 28 Of-
ficials and Administrators, 5 of the 58 Professionals, 12 of the 
124 Technicians, none of the Skilled Craft Workers, and 1-
who was Joyc~f the 110 Road Maintenance Workers. 
Id., at 51-52. The Plan sought to remedy these imbalances 
through "hiring, training and promotion of ... women 
throughout the Agency in all major job classifications where 
they are underrepresented." I d., at 43. 
As an initial matter, the Agency adopted as a benchmark 
for measuring progress in eliminating underrepresentation 
the long-term goal of a work force that mirrored in its major 
job classifications the percentage of women in the area labor 
market. 7 Even as it did so, however, the Agency acknowl- ( 
edged that such a figure could not itself necessarily justify 
taking into account the sex of applicants for positions in all . 
job categories. For positions requiring specialized training 
and experience, the Plan observed that the number of minor-
ities and women "who possess the qualifications required for 
entry into such job classifications is limited." I d., at 56. 
The Plan therefore directed that annual short-term goals be 
formulated that would provide a more realistic indication of 
the degree to which sex should be taken into account in filling 
particular positions. I d., at 61-64. The Plan stressed that 
such goals "should not be construed as 'quotas' that must be 
met," but as reasonable aspirations in correcting the imbal-
ance in the Agency's work force. /d., at 64. These goals 
were to take into account factors such as "turnover, layoffs, 
lateral transfers, new job openings, retirements and avail-
ability of minorities, women and handicapped persons in the 
area work force who possess the desired qualifications or po-
tential for placement." Ibid. The Plan specifically directed 
that, in establishing such goals, the Agency work with the 
1 Because of the employment decision at issue in this case, our discus-
sion henceforth refers primarily to the Plan's provisions to remedy the un-
derrepresentation of women. Our analysis could apply as well, however, 
to the provisions of the plan pertaining to minorities. 
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County Planning Department and other sources in attempt-
ing to compile data on the percentage of minorities and 
women in the local labor force that were actually working in 
the job classifications comprising the Agency work force. 
I d., at 63-64. From the outset, therefore, the Plan sought 
annually to develop even more refined measures of the un-
derrepresentation in each job category that required 
attention. 
As the Agency Plan recognized, women were most egre-
giously underrepresented in the Skilled Craft job category, 
since none of the 238 positions was occupied by a woman. In 
mid-1980, when Joyce was selected for the road dispatcher 
position, the Agency was still in the process of refining its 
short-term goals for Skilled Craft Workers in accordance 
with the directive of the Plan. This process did not reach 
fruition until1982, when the Agency established a short-term 
goal for that year of three women for the 55 expected open-
ings in that job category-a modest goal of about 6% for that 
category. 
We reject petitioner's argument that, since only the long-
term goal was in place for Skilled Craft positions at the time 
of Joyce's promotion, it was inappropriate for the Director to 
take into account affirmative action considerations in filling 
the road dispatcher position. The Agency's Plan emphasized 
that the long-term goals were not to be taken as guides for 
actual hiring decisions, but that supervisors were to consider 
a host of practical factors in seeking to meet affirmative ac-
tion objectives, including the fact that in some job categories 
women were not qualified in numbers comparable to their 
representation in the labor force. 
By contrast, had the Plan simply calculated imbalances in 
all categories according to the proportion of women in the 
area labor pool, and then directed that hiring be governed 
solely by those figures, its validity fairly could be called into 
question. This is because analysis of a more specialized 
labor pool normally is necessary in determining underrepre-
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sentation in some positions. If a plan failed to take distinc-
tions in qualifications into account in providing guidance for 
actual employment decisions, it would dictate mere blind hir-
ing by the numbers, for it would hold supervisors to "achieve-
ment of a particular percentage of minority employment or 
membership . . . regardless of circumstances such as eco-
nomic conditions or the number of qualified minority appli-
cants ... " Sheet Metal Workers' v. EEOC, 478 U. S. --
(1986) (JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
The Agency's Plan emphatically did not authorize such 
blind hiring. It expressly directed that numerous factors be 
taken into account in making hiring decisions, including spe-
cifically the qualifications of female applicants for particular 
jobs. Thus, despite the fact that no precise short-term goal 
was yet in place for the Skilled Craft category in mid-1980, 
the Agency's management nevertheless had been clearly in-
structed that they were not to hire solely by reference to sta-
tistics. The fact that only the long-term goal had been es-
tablished for this category posed no danger that personnel 
decisions would be made by reflexive adherence to a numeri-
cal standard. 
Furthermore, in considering the candidates for the road 
dispatcher position in 1980, the Agency hardly needed to rely 
on a refined short-term goal to realize that it had a significant 
problem of underrepresentation that required attention. 
Given the obvious imbalance in the Skilled Craft category, 
and given the Agency's commitment to eliminating such im-
balances, it was plainly not unreasonable for the Agency to 
determine that it was appropriate to consider as one factor 
the sex of Ms. Joyce in making its decision. 8 The promotion 
• In addition, the Agency was mindful of the importance of finally hiring 
a woman in a job category that had fonnerly been all-male. The Director 
testified that, while the promotion of Joyce "made a small dent, for sure, in 
the numbers," nonetheless "philosophically it made a larger impact in that 
it probably has encouraged other females and minorities to look at the pos-
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of Joyce thus satisfies the first requirement enunciated in 
Weber, since it was undertaken to further an affirmative ac-
tion plan designed to eliminate Agency work force imbalances 
in traditionally segregated job categories. 
We next consider whether the Agency Plan unnecessarily 
trammeled the rights of male employees or created an abso-
lute bar to their advancement. In contrast to the plan in We-
ber, which provided that 50% of the positions in the craft 
training program were exclusively for blacks, and to the con-
sent decree upheld last term in Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 
U. S. -- (1986), which required the promotion of specific 
numbers of minorities, the Plan sets aside no positions for 
women. The Plan expressly states that "[t]he 'goals' estab-
lished for each· Division should not be construed as 'quotas' 
that must be met." App. 64. Rather, the Plan merely au-
thorizes that consideration be given to affirmative action con-
cerns when evaluating qualified applicants. As the Agency 
Director testified, the sex of Joyce was but one of numerous 
factors he took into acount in arriving at his decision. Tr. 
68. The Plan thus resembles the "Harvard Plan" approv-
ingly noted by JUSTICE POWELL in University of California 
Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 316-319 (1978), which con-
siders race along with other criteria in determining admission 
to the college. As JUSTICE PowELL observed, "In such an 
admissions program, race or ethnic background may be 
deemed a 'plus' in a particular applicant's file, yet it does not 
insulate the individual from comparison with all other candi-
dates for the available seats." !d., at 317. Similarly, the 
Agency Plan requires women to compete with all other quali-
fied applicants. No persons are automatically excluded from 
consideration; all are able to have their qualifications 
weighed against those of other applicants. 
In addition, petitioner had no absolute entitlement to the 
road dispatcher position. Seven of the applicants were clas-
sibility of so-called 'non-traditional' jobs as areas where they and the 
agency both have samples of a success story." Tr. 64. 
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sified as qualified and eligible, and the Agency Director was 
authorized to promote any of the seven. Thus, denial of the 
promotion unsettled no legitimate firmly rooted expectation 
on the part of the petitioner. Furthermore, while the peti-
tioner in this case was denied a promotion, he retained his 
employment with the Agency, at the same salary and with 
the same seniority, and remained eligible for other 
promotions. 9 
Finally, the Agency's Plan was intended to attain a bal-
anced work force, not to maintain one. The Plan contains 
ten references to the Agency's desire to "attain" such a bal-
ance, but no reference whatsoever to a goal of maintaining it. 
The Director testified that, while the "broader goal" of af-
firmative action, defined as "the desire to hire, to promote, to 
give opportunity and training on an equitable, non-discrimi-
natory basis," is something that is "a permanent part" of "the 
Agency's operating philosophy," that broader goal "is di-
vorced, if you will, from specific numbers or percentages." 
Tr. 48-49. 
The Agency acknowledged the difficulties that it would 
confront in remedying the imbalance in its work force, and 
anticipated only gradual increases in the representation of 
minorities and women. 10 It is thus unsurprising that the 
• Furthennore, from 1978 to 1982 Skilled Craft jobs in the Agency in-
creased from 238 to 349. The Agency's personnel figures indicate that the 
Agency fully expected most of these positions to be filled by men. Of the 
111 new Skilled Craft jobs during this period, 105, or almost 951l, went to 
men. As previously noted, the Agency's 1982 Plan set a goal of hiring only 
three women out of the 55 new Skilled Craft positions projected for that 
year, a figure of about 6%. While this degree of employment expansion by 
an employer is by no means essential to a plan's validity, it underscores the 
fact that the Plan in this case in no way significantly restricts the employ-
ment prospects of such persons. Illustrative of this is the fact that an ad-
ditional road dispatcher position was created in 1983, and petitioner was 
awarded the job. Brief for Respondent Transportation Agency 36, n. 35. 
10 As the Agency Plan stated, after noting the limited number of minor-
ities and women qualified in certain categories, as well as other difficulties 
in remedying underrepresentation: 
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Plan contains no explicit end date, for the Agency's flexible, 
case-by-case approach was not expected to yield success in a 
brief period of time. Express assurance that a program is 
only temporary may be necessary if the program actually 
sets aside positions according to specific numbers. See, 
e. g., Firefighters, supra, at-- (four-year duration for con-
sent decree providing for promotion of particular number of 
minorities); Weber, 443 U. S., at 199 (plan requiring that 
blacks constitute 50% of new trainees in effect until percent-
age of employer work force equal to percentage in local labor 
force). This is necessary both to minimize the effect of the 
program on other employees, and to ensure that the plan's 
goals "[are] not being used simply to achieve and maintain 
... balance, but rather as a benchmark against which" the 
employer may measure its progress in eliminating the 
underrepresention of minorities and women. Sheet Metal 
Workers, supra, at--. In this case, however, substantial 
evidence shows that the Agency has sought to take a moder-
ate, gradual approach to eliminating the imbalance in its 
work force, one which establishes realistic guidance for em-
ployment decisions, and which visits minimal intrusion on the 
legitimate expectations of other employees. Given this fact, 
as well as the Agency's express commitment to "attain" a bal-
anced work force, there is ample assurance that the Agency 
does not seek to use its Plan to maintain a permanent racial 
and sexual balance. 
"As indicated by the above factOrs, it will be much easier to attain the 
Agency's employment goals in some job categories than in others. It is 
particularly evident that it will be extremely difficult to significantly in-
crease the representation of women in technical and skilled craft job classi-
fications where they have traditionally been greatly underrepresented. 
Similarly, only gradual increases in the representation of women, minor-
ities or handicapped persons in management and professional positions can 
realistically be expected due to the low turnover that exists in these posi-
tions and the small numbers of persons who can be expected to compete for 
available openings." App. 58. 
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III 
In evaluating the compliance of an affirmative action plan 
with Title VII's prohibition on discrimination, we must be 
mindful of "this Court's and Congress' consistent emphasis on 
'the value of voluntary efforts to further the objectives of the 
law.'" Wygant, 476 U. S., at-- (JUSTICE O'CONNOR, con-
curring in part and concurring in judgment) (quoting Bakke, 
supra, at 364). The Agency in the case before us has under-
taken such a voluntary effort, and has done so in full recogni-
tion of both the difficulties and the potential for intrusion on \ 
males and non-minorities. The Agency has identified a con-
spicuous imbalance in job categories traditionally segregated 
by race and sex. It has made clear from the outset, how-
ever, that employment decisions may not be justified solely 
by reference to this imbalance, but must rest on a multitude 
of practical, realistic factors. It has therefore committed it-
self to annual adjustment of goals so as to provide a reason-
able guide for actual hiring and promotion decisions. The 
Agency earmarks no positions for anyone; sex is but one of 
several factors that may be taken into account in evaluating 
qualified applicants for a position. As both the Plan's lan-
guage and its maimer of operation attest, the Agency has no 
intention of establishing a work force whose permanent com-
position is dictated by rigid numerical standards. 
We therefore hold that the Agency appropriately took into 
account as one factor the sex of Diane Joyce in determining 
that she should be promoted to the road dispatcher position. 
The decision to do so was made pursuant to an affirmative ac-
tion plan that represents a moderate, flexible, case-by-case 
approach to effecting a gradual improvement in the represen-
tation of minorities and women in the Agency's work force. 
Such a plan is fully consistent with Title VII, for it embodies 
the contribution that voluntary employer action can make in 
eliminating the vestiges of discrimination in the workplace. 
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE w ... J . BRENNAN, JR. 
.inprmtt <!Joud of tlft ~b ,itattg 
'Jfas~ ~. <!J. 2n~,.~ 
February 26, 1987 
Johnson v. Santa Clara County, No. 85-1129 
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response to Nino's dissent in this case. 
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Dear Nino, 
Please join me in Parts I and II of your 
dissenting opinion. I shall add a few words 
of my own. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Scalia 
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: 85-1129 - Johnson v. Transportation Agency 
I have sent the following dissent to the printer: 
JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting. 
I agree with Parts I and II of JUSTICE 
SCALIA's dissenting opinion. Although I do not join 
Part III, -· I also would overrule Weber. My 
understanding of Weber was, and is, that the employer's 
plan did not violate Title VII because it was designed 
to remedy intentional and systematic exclusion of 
blacks by the employer and the unions from certain job 
categories. That is how I understood the phrase 
"traditionally segregated jobs" we referred to in that 
case. The Court now interprets it to mean nothing more 
than a manifest imbalance between one identifiable 
group and another in an employer's labor force. As so 
interpreted, that case, as well as today's decision, as 
JUSTICE SCALIA so well demonstrates, is a perversion of 
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.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, .JR . 
February 27, 1987 
Re: No. 85-1129, Johnson v. Transportation Agency 
Dear Bill: 
I have reviewed your proposed additions to the Court 
opinion in this case and in general they are fine. I would 
appreciate it, however, if you could remove the discussion 
of the Birmingham campaign that composes the bulk of new 
footnote 7. This discussion, based as it is on newspaper 
references, seems unnecessary and I think it may detract 
from the strength and persuasiveness of your excellent Court 
opinion. 
Also, I do not read your Court opinion to contradict, 
in the context of Title VII, the holding of the Court last 
term in wygant that "societal discrimination alone" is not 
"sufficient to justify a racial classification." 106 S. 
Ct., at 1847. But I am concerned that new footnote 14 might 
convey this impression. Perhaps you could replace the last 
two sentences in that footnote with something along the 
lines of the following: 
This simplistic dichotomy requires the unre-
alistic assumption that "longstanding social 
attitudes" are somehow apart from and unin-
fluenced by [employment] discrimination, and 
that the historical absence of "women eager 
to shoulder pick and shovel," post, at ___ , 
simply reflects the operation of private un-
constrained choices. We do not view "long-
standing social attitudes" and "conscious, 
exclusionary discrimination" as "certainly 
distinct." Post, at • On the contrary, 
in the context of the workplace they may well 
coincide. While the dissent focuses on the 
impact of societal attitudes on "women them-
selves" as potential job applicants, post, at 
, it ignores the fact that societal atti-
tudes may also be held by employers, and if 
so, may directly result in discriminatory 
employment decisions. Although it is true 
that general societal disc~imination or atti-
tudes do not alone justify the adoption of an 
affirmative action plan, it is also true that 
the possibility of their existence does not 
preclude such a plan. The requirement that a 
manifest imbalance exist in a traditionally 
segregated job category is pertinent proof 
that conscious, exclusionary conduct has oc-
curred and that the adoption of an affirma-
tive action plan may be justified. 
Thank you so much, Bill, for your attention to my con-
cerns. This is another "landmark" decision. You can well 
be proud of both this case and Paradise (except of course 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-1129 
PAUL E. JOHNSON, PETITIONER v. TRANSPORTA-
TION AGENCY, SANTA CLARA COUNTY, 
CALIFORNIA, ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[March - , 1987] 
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Respondent, Transportation Agency of Santa Clara 
County, California, unilaterally promulgated an Affirmative 
Action Plan applicable, inter alia, to promotions of employ-
ees. In selecting applicants for the promotional position of 
road dispatcher, the Agency, pursuant to the Plan, passed 
over petitioner Paul Johnson, a male employee, and pro-
moted a female employee applicant, Diane Joyce. The ques-
tion for decision is whether in making the promotion the 
Agency impermissibly took into account the sex of the appli-
cants in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. 1 The District Court for the 
Northern District of California, in an action filed by peti-
' Section 703(a) of the Act, 78 Stat. 255, as amended, 86 Stat. 109, 42 
U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a), provides that it "shall be an unlawful employment 
practice for an employer-
"(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise 
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
"(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual 
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an 
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin." 
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tioner following receipt of a right-to-sue letter from the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), held 
that respondent had violated Title VII. App. to Pet. for 
Cert. 1a. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re-
versed. 748 F. 2d 1308 (1984); modified, 770 F. 2d 752 




In December 1978, the Santa Clara County Transit District 
Board of Supervisors adopted an Affirmative Action Plan 
(Plan) for the County Transportation Agency. The Plan im-
plemented a County Affirmative Action Plan, which had been 
adopted, declared the County, because "mere prohibition of 
discriminatory practices is not enough to remedy the effects 
of past practices and to permit attainment of an equitable 
representation of minorities, women and handicapped per-
sons." App. 31. 3 Relevant to this case, the Agency Plan 
provides that, in making promotions to positions within a tra-
ditionally segregated job classification in which women have 
been significantly underrepresented, the Agency is author-
ized to consider as one factor the sex of a qualified applicant. 
In reviewing the composition of its work force, the Agency 
noted in its Plan that women were represented in numbers 
far less than their proportion of the county labor force in both 
the Agency as a whole and in five of seven job categories. 
2 No constitutional issue was either raised or addressed in the litigation 
below. See 748 F. 2d 1308, 1310, n. 1 (1984). We therefore decide in this 
case only the issue of the prohibitory scope of Title VII. Of course, where 
the issue is properly raised, public employers must justify the adaption and 
implementation of a voluntary affirmative action plan under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. See Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, - U. S. 
- (1986). 
3 The Plan reaffirmed earlier County and Agency efforts to address the 
issue of employment discrimination, dating back to the County's adoption 
in 1971 of an Equal Employment Opportunity Policy. App. 37-40. 
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Specifically, while women constituted 36.4% of the area labor 
market, they composed only 22.4% of Agency employees. 
Furthermore, women working at the Agency were concen-
trated largely in EEOC job categories traditionally held by 
women: women made up 76% of Office and Clerical Workers, 
but only 7.1% of Agency Officials and Administrators, 8.6% 
of Professionals, 9. 7% of Technicians, and 22% of Service and 
Maintenance workers. As for the job classification relevant 
to this case, none of the 238 Skilled Craft Worker positions 
was held by a woman. I d., at 49. The Plan noted that this 
underrepresentation of women in part reflected the fact that 
women had not traditionally been employed in these posi-
tions, and that they had not been strongly motivated to seek 
training or employment in them "because of the limited 
opportunities that have existed in the past for them to work 
in such classifications." I d., at 57. The Plan also observed 
that, while the proportion of ethnic minorities in the Agency 
as a whole exceeded the proportion of such minorities in the 
county work force, a smaller percentage of minority employ-
ees held management, professional, and technical positions. 4 
The Agency stated that its Plan was intended to achieve "a 
statistically measurable yearly improvement in hiring, train-
ing and promotion of minorities and women throughout the 
Agency in all major job classifications where they are under-
represented." !d., at 43. As a benchmark by which to eval-
uate progress, the Agency stated that its long-term goal was 
to attain a work force whose composition reflected the pro-
portion of minorities and women in the area labor force. I d. , 
at 54. Thus, for the Skilled Craft category in which the road 
dispatcher position at issue here was classified, the Agency's 
aspiration was that eventually about 36% of the jobs would be 
occupied by women. 
• While minorities constituted 19.7% of the county labor force, they rep-
resented 7.1% of the Agency's Officials and Administrators, 19% of its Pro-
fessionals, and 16.9% of its Technicians. /d., at 48. 
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The Plan acknowledged that a number of factors might 
make it unrealistic to rely on the Agency's long-term goals in 
evaluating the Agency's progress in expanding job opportuni-
ties for minorities and women. Among the factors identified 
were low turnover rates in some classifications, the fact that 
some jobs involved heavy labor, the small number of posi-
tions within some job categories, the limited number of entry 
positions leading to the Technical and Skilled Craft classi-
fications, and the limited number of minorities and women 
qualified for positions requiring specialized training and ex-
perience. Id., at 56-57. As a result, the Plan counselled 
that short-range goals be established and annually adjusted 
to serve as the most realistic guide for actual employment 
decisions. Among the tasks identified as important in es-
tablishing such· short-term goals was the acquisition of data 
"reflecting the ratio of minorities, women and handicapped 
persons who are working in the local area in major job classi-
fications relating to those utilized by the County Administra-
tion," so as to determine the availability of members of such 
groups who "possess the desired qualifications or potential 
for placement." I d., at 64. These data on qualified group 
members, along with predictions of position vacancies, were 
to serve as the basis for "realistic yearly employment goals 
for women, minorities and handicapped persons in each 
EEOC job category and major job classification." Ibid. 
The Agency's Plan thus set aside no specific number of po-
sitions for minorities or women, but authorized the consider-
ation of ethnicity or sex as a factor when evaluating qualified 
candidates for jobs in which members of such groups were 
poorly represented. One such job was the road dispatcher 
position that is the subject of the dispute in this case. 
B 
On December 12, 1979, the Agency announced a vacancy 
for the promotional position of road dispatcher in the Agen-
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ment, and materials, and maintain records pertaining to road 
maintenance jobs. ld., at 23-24. The position requires at 
minimum four years of dispatch or road maintenance work 
experience for Santa Clara County. The EEOC job classifi-
cation scheme designates a road dispatcher as a Skilled Craft 
worker. 
Twelve County employees applied for the promotion, in-
cluding Joyce and Johnson. Joyce had worked for the 
County since 1970, serving as an account clerk until 1975. 
She had applied for a road dispatcher position in 1974, but 
was deemed ineligible because she had not served as a road 
maintenance worker. In 1975, Joyce transferred from a se-
nior account clerk position to a road maintenance worker 
position, becoming the first woman to fill such a job. Tr. 
83-84. During her four years in that position, she occasion-
ally worked out of class as a road dispatcher. 
Petitioner Johnson began with the county in 1967 as a road 
yard clerk, after private employment that included working 
as a supervisor and dispatcher. He had also unsuccessfully 
applied for the road dispatcher opening in 1974. In 1977, his 
clerical position was downgraded, and he sought and received 
a transfer to the position of road maintenance worker. !d., 
at 127. He also occasionally worked out of class as a dis-
patcher while performing that job. 
Nine of the applicants, including Joyce and Johnson, were 
deemed qualified for the job, and were interviewed by a two-
person board. Seven of the applicants scored above 70 on 
this interview, which meant that they were certified as eligi-
ble for selection by the appointing authority. The scores 
awarded ranged from 70 to 80. Johnson was tied for second 
with score of 75, while Joyce ranked next with a score of 73. 
A second interview was conducted by three Agency supervi-
sors, who ultimately recommended that Johnson be pro-
moted. Prior to the second interview, Joyce had contacted 
the County's Affirmative Action Office because she feared 
85-112~0PINION 
6 JOHNSON v. TRANSPORTATION AGENCY 
that her application might not receive disinterested review. 5 
The Office in turn contacted the Agency's Affirmative Action 
Coordinator, whom the Agency's Plan makes responsible for, 
inter alia, keeping the Director informed of opportunities for 
the Agency to accomplish its objectives under the Plan. At 
the time, the Agency employed no women in any Skilled 
Craft position, and had never employed a woman as a road 
dispatcher. The Coordinator recommended to the Director 
of the Agency, James Graebner, that Joyce be promoted. 
Graebner, authorized to choose any of the seven persons 
deemed eligible, thus had the benefit of suggestions by the 
second interview panel and by the Agency Coordinator in ar-
riving at his decision. After deliberation, Graebner con-
cluded that the promotion should be given to Joyce. As he 
testified: "I tried to look at the whole picture, the combina-
tion of her qualifications and Mr. Johnson's qualifications, 
their test scores, their expertise, their background, affirma-
6 Joyce testified that she had had disagreements with two of the three 
members of the second interview panel. One had been her first supervisor 
when she began work as a road maintenance worker. In performing ardu-
ous work in this job, she had not been issued coveralls, although her male 
co-workers had received them. After ruining her pants, she complained 
to her supervisor, to no avail. After three other similar incidents, ruining 
clothes on each occasion, she filed a grievance, and was issued four pair of 
coveralls the next day. Tr. 89-90. Joyce had dealt with a second member 
of the panel for a year and a half in her capacity as chair of the Roads Oper-
ations Safety Committee, where she and he "had several differences of 
opinion on how safety should be implemented." ld. , at 90-91. In addi-
tion, Joyce testified that she had informed the person responsible for ar-
ranging her second interview that she had a disaster preparedness class on 
a certain day the following week. By this time about ten days had passed 
since she had notified this person of her availability, and no date had yet 
been set for the interview. Within a day or two after this conversation, 
however, she received a notice setting her interview at a time directly in 
the middle of her disaster preparedness class. I d. , at 94-95. This same 
panel member had earlier described Joyce as a "rebel-rousing, skirt-wear-
ing person," Tr. 153. 
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tive action matters, things like that ... I believe it was a 
combination of all those." I d., at 68. 
The certification form naming Joyce as the person pro-
moted to the dispatcher position stated that both she and 
Johnson were rated as well-qualified for the job. The eval-
uation of Joyce read: "Well qualified by virtue of 18 years of 
past clerical experience including 3Yz years at West Yard plus 
almost 5 years as a [road maintenance worker]." App. 27. 
The evaluation of Johnson was as follows: "Well qualified ap-
plicant; two years of [road maintenance worker] experience 
plus 11 years of Road Yard Clerk. Has had previous outside 
Dispatch experience but was 13 years ago." Ibid . Graeb-
ner testified that he did not regard as significant the fact that 
Johnson scored 75 and Joyce 73 when interviewed by the 
two-person board. Tr. 57-58. 
Petitioner Johnson filed a complaint with the EEOC alleg-
ing that he had been denied promotion on the basis of sex in 
violation of Title VII. He received a right-to-sue letter from 
the agency on March 10, 1981, and on March 20, 1981, filed 
suit in the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California. The District Court found that Johnson 
was more qualified for the dispatcher position than Joyce, 
and that the sex of Joyce was the "determining factor in her 
selection." App. to Pet. for Cert. 4a (emphasis in original). 
The court acknowledged that, since the Agency justified its 
decision on the basis of its Affirmative Action Plan, the crite-
ria announced in Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193 (1979), 
should be applied. App. to Pet. for Cert. 5a. It then found 
the Agency's Plan invalid on the ground that the evidence did 
not satisfy Weber's criterion that the Plan be temporary. 
App. to Pet. for Cert. 6a. The Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the absence of an ex-
press termination date in the Plan was not dispositive, since 
the Plan repeatedly expressed its objective as the attain-
ment, rather than the maintenance, of a work force mirroring 
the labor force in the county. 748 F. 2d, at 1312, modified, 
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770 F. 2d 752 (1985). . The Court of Appeals added that the 
fact that the Plan established no fixed percentage of positions 
for minorities or women made it less essential that the Plan 
contain a relatively explicit deadline. 748 F. 2d, at 1312. 
The Court held further that the Agency's consideration of 
Joyce's sex in filling the road dispatcher position was lawful. 
The Agency Plan had been adopted, the court said, to ad-
dress a conspicuous imbalance in the Agency's work force, 
· and neither unnecessarily trammeled the rights of other em-
ployees, nor created an absolute bar to their advancement. 
I d., at 1313-1314. 
II 
As a preliminary matter, we note that petitioner bears the 
burden of establishing the invalidity of the Agency's Plan. 
Only last term in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 
476 U. S. -,- (1986), we held that "[t]he ultimate bur-
den remains with the employees to demonstrate the uncon-
stitutionality of an affirmative-action program," and we see 
no basis for a different rule regarding a plan's alleged viola-
tion of Title VII. This case also fits readily within the an-
alytical framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973). Once a plaintiff establishes a 
prima facie case that race or sex has been taken into account 
in an employer's employment decision, the burden shifts to 
the employer to articulate a nondiscriminatory rationale for 
its decision. The existence of an affirmative action plan pro-
vides such a rationale. If such a plan is articulated as the 
basis for the employer's decision, the burden shifts to the 
plaintiff to prove that the plan is invalid and the employer's 
justification is pretextual. As a practical matter, of course, 
an employer will generally seek to avoid a charge of pretext 
by presenting evidence in support of its plan. That does not 
mean, however, as petitioner suggests, that reliance on an af-
firmative action plan is to be treated as an affirmative de-
fense requiring the employer to carry the burden of proving 
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the validity of the plan. The burden of proving its invalidity 
remains on the plaintiff. 
The assessment of the legality of the Agency Plan must be 
guided by our decision in Weber, supra. 6 In that case, the 
Court addressed the question whether the employer violated 
Title VII by adopting a voluntary affirmative action plan de-
signed to "eliminate manifest racial imbalances in tradition-
ally segregated job categories." !d., at 197. The respond-
ent employee in that case challenged the employer's denial of 
his application for a position in a newly established craft 
training program, contending that the employer's selection 
process impermissibly took into account the race of the appli-
cants. The selection process was guided by an affirmative 
6 The dissent maintains that the obligations of a public employer under 
Title VII must be identical to its obligations under the Constitution, and 
that a public employer's adoption of an affirmative action plan therefore 
should be governed by Wygant. This rests on the following logic: Title VI 
embodies the same constraints as the Constitution; Title VI and Title VII 
have the same prohibitory scope; therefore, Title VII and the Constitution 
are coterminous for purposes of this case. The flaw is with the second 
step of the analysis, for it advances a proposition that we explicitly consid-
ered and rejected in Weber. As we noted in that case, Title VI was an 
exercise of federal power "over a matter in which the Federal Government 
was already directly involved," since Congress "was legislating to assure 
federal funds would not be used in an improper manner." 443 U. S., at 
206 n. 6. "Title VII, by contrast, was enacted pursuant to the commerce 
power to regulate purely private decisionmaking and was not intended to 
incorporate and particularize the commands of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. Title VII and Title VI, therefore, cannot be read in pari 
materia." Ibid. While public employers were not added to the definition 
of "employer" in Title VII until 1972, there is no evidence that this mere 
addition to the definitional section of the statute was intended to transform 
the substantive standard governing employer conduct. Indeed, "Con-
gress expressly indicated the intent that the same Title VII principles be 
applied to governmental and private employers alike." Dothard v. Raw-
linson, 433 U. S. 321, 332 n. 14 (1977). The fact that a public employer 
must also satisfy the Constitution does not negate the fact that the statu-
tory prohibition with which that employer must contend was not intended 
to extend as far as that of the Constitution. 
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action plan, which provided that 50% of the new trainees 
were to be black until the percentage of black skilled craft-
workers in the employer's plant approximated the percent-
age of blacks in the local labor force. Adoption of the plan 
had been prompted by the fact that only 5 of 273, or 1.83%, of 
skilled craftworkers at the plant were black, even though the 
work force in the area was approximately 39% black. Be-
cause of the historical exclusion of blacks from craft positions, 
the employer regarded its former policy of hiring trained out-
siders as inadequate. to redress the imbalance in its work 
force. 
We upheld the employer's decision to select less senior 
black applicants over the white respondent, for we found that 
taking race into account was consistent with Title VII's ob-
jective of "break[ing] down old patterns of racial segregation 
and hierarchy." Id., at 208. 7 We noted that the plan did 
not "unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white em-
ployees," since it did not require "the discharge of white 
workers and their replacement with new black hirees." 
Ibid. Nor did the plan create "an absolute bar to the ad-
vancement of white employees," since half of those trained in 
the new program were to be white. Ibid. Finally, we ob-
served that the plan was a temporary measure, not designed 
7 The dissent maintains that Weber's conclusion that Title VII does not 
prohibit voluntary affirmative action programs "rewrote the statute it pur-
ported to construe." Post, at-. Weber's decisive rejection of the ar-
gument that the "plain language" of the statute prohibits affirmative action 
rested on (1) legislative history indicating Congress' clear intention that 
employers play a major role in eliminating the vestiges of discrimination, 
443 U. S., at 201-204, and (2) the language and legislative history of 
§ 703(j) of the statute, which reflect a strong desire to preserve managerial 
prerogatives so that they might be utilized for this purpose. !d. , at 
204-207. As JUSTICE BLACKMUN said in his concurrence in Weber, "[I]f 
the Court has misperceived the political will , it has the assurance that be-
cause the question is statutory Congress may set a different course if it so 
chooses." Id ., at 216. Congress has not amended the statute to reject 
our construction, nor have any such amendments even been proposed, and 
we therefore may assume that our interpretation was correct. 
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to maintain racial balance, but to "eliminate a manifest racial 
imbalance." Ibid. As JUSTICE BLACKMUN's concurrence 
made clear, Weber held that an employer seeking to justify 
the adoption of a plan need not point to its own prior discrimi-
natory practices, nor even to evidence of an "arguable viola-
tion" on its part. !d., at 212. Rather, it need point only to a 
"conspicuous ... imbalance in traditionally segregated job 
categories." !d., at 209. Our decision was grounded on the 
recognition that voluntary employer action can play a crucial 
role in furthering Title VII's purpose of eliminating the ef-
fects of discrimination in the workplace, and that Title VII 
should not be read to thwart such efforts. I d., at 204. 8 
8 See also Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U. S. --, -- (1986) ("We 
have on numerous occasions recognized that Congress intended for volun-
tary compliance to be the preferred means of achieving the objectives of 
Title VII"); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U. S. 36, 44 (1974) ("Co-
operation and voluntary compliance were selected as the preferred means 
for achieving [Title VII's] goal"). The dissent's suggestion that an affirm-
ative action program may be adopted only to redress an employer's past 
discrimination, see post, at--, was rejected in Steelworkers v. Weber, 
443 U. S. 193 (1979), because the prospect of liability created by such an 
admission would create a significant disincentive for voluntary action. As 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN's concurrence in that case pointed out, such a stand-
ard would "plac[e] voluntary compliance with Title VII in profound jeop-
ardy. The only way for the employer and the union to keep their footing 
on the 'tightrope' it creates would be to eschew all forms of voluntary af-
firmative action." 443 U. S., at 210. Similarly, JusTICE O'CONNOR has 
observed in the constitutional context, "[t]he imposition of a requirement 
that public employers make findings that they have engaged in illegal dis-
crimination before they engage in affirmative action programs would se-
verely undermine public employers' incentive to meet voluntarily their civil 
rights obligations." Wygant, supra, at-- (O'CONNOR, J . , concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment). 
Contrary to the dissent's contention, post , at --, our decisions last 
term in Firefighters , supra, and Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC , 478 U. S. 
-- (1986), provide no support for a standard more restrictive than that 
enunciated in Weber. Firefighters raised the issue of the conditions under 
which parties could enter into a consent decree providing for explicit nu-
merical quotas. By contrast , the affirmative action plan in this case sets 
aside no positions for minorities or women. See infra, at 16-17. In Sheet 
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In reviewing the employment decision at issue in this case, 
we must first examine whether that decision was made p~r­
suant to a plan prompted by concerns similar to those of the 
employer in Weber. Next, we must determine whether the 
effect of the plan on males and non-minorities is comparable 
to the effect of the plan in that case. 
The first issue is therefore whether consideration of the 
sex of applicants for skilled craft jobs was justified by the ex-
istence of a "manifest imbalance" that reflected underrepre-
sentation of women in "traditionally segregated job catego-
ries." ld., at 197. In determining whether an imbalance 
exists that would justify taking sex or race into account, a 
comparison of the percentage of minorities or women in the 
employer's work force with the percentage in the area labor 
market or general population is appropriate in analyzing jobs 
that require no special expertise, see Teamsters v. United 
States, 431 U. S. 324 (1977) (comparison between percentage 
of blacks in employer's work force and in general population 
proper in determining extent of imbalance in truck driving 
positions), or training programs designed to provide exper-
tise, see Weber, supra (comparison between proportion of 
blacks working at plant and proportion of blacks in area labor 
force appropriate in calculating imbalance for purpose of 
establishing preferential admission to craft training pro-
gram). Where a job requires special training, however, the 
comparison should be with those in the labor force who pos-
sess the relevant qualifications. See Hazelwood School Dis-
trict v. United States, 433 U. S. 299 (1977) (must compare 
Metal Workers , the issue we addressed was the scope of judicial remedial 
authority under Title VII , authority that has not been exercised in this 
case. The dissent's suggestion that employers should be able to do no 
more voluntarily than courts can order as remedies, post , at -, ignores 
the fundamental difference between volitional private behavior and the ex-
ercise of coercion by the state. Plainly, "Congress' concern that federal 
courts not impose unwanted obligations on employers and unions ," Fire-
fighters , supra, at -, reflects a desire to preserve a relatively large 
domain for voluntary employer action. 
85-1129-0PINION 
JOHNSON v. TRANSPORTATION AGENCY 13 
percentage of blacks in employer's work ranks with percent-
age of qualified black teachers in area labor force in determin-
ing underrepresentation in teaching positions). The require-
ment that the "manifest imbalance" relate to a "traditionally 
segregated job category" provides assurance that sex or race 
will be taken into account in a manner consistent with Title 
VII's purpose of eliminating the effects of employment 
discrimination. 
A manifest imbalance need not be such that it would sup-
port a prima facie case against the employer, as suggested in 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR's concurrence, post, since we do not re-
gard as identical the constraints of Title VII and the federal 
constitution on voluntarily adopted affirmative action plans. 
Application of the "prima facie" standard in Title VII cases 
would be inconsistent with Weber's focus on statistical imbal-
ance, 9 and could inappropriately create a significant disin-
9 The difference between the "manifest imbalance" and "prima facie" 
standards is illuminated by Weber. Had the Court in that case been con-
cerned with past discrimination by the employer, it would have focused on 
discrimination in hiring skilled, not unskilled, workers , since only the scar-
city of the former in Kaiser's work force would have made it vulnerable to a 
Title VII suit. In order to make out a prima facie case on such a claim, a 
plaintiff would be required to compare the percentage of black skilled 
workers in the Kaiser work force with the percentage of black skilled craft 
workers in the area labor market. 
Weber obviously did not make such a comparison. Instead, it focused on 
the disparity between the percentage of black skilled craft workers in Kai-
ser's ranks and the percentage of blacks in the area labor force. 443 U. S. , 
at 198-199. Such an approach reflected a recognition that the proportion 
of black craft workers in the local labor force was likely as miniscule as the 
proportion in Kaiser's work force. The Court realized that the lack of im-
balance between these figures would mean that employers in precisely 
those industries in which discrimination has been most effective would be 
precluded from adopting training programs to increase the percentage of 
qualified minorities. Thus, in cases such as Weber, where the employment 
decision at issue involves the selection of unskilled persons for a training 
program, the "manifest imbalance" standard permits comparison with the 
general labor force. By contrast, the "prima facie" standa-rd would re-
quire comparison with the percentage of minorities or women qualified for 
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centive for employers to adopt an affirmative action plan. 
See Weber, supra, at 204 (Titl~ VII intended as a "catalyst" 
for employer efforts to eliminate vestiges of discrimination). 
A corporation concerned with maximizing return on invest-
ment, for instance, is hardly likely to adopt a plan if in order 
to do so it must compile evidence that could be used to sub-
ject it to a colorable Title VII suit. 10 
It is clear that the decision to hire Joyce was made pursu-
ant to an Agency plan that directed that sex or race by taken 
into account for the purpose of remedying underrepresenta-
tion. The Agency Plan acknowledged the "limited opportu-
nities that have existed in the past," App. 57, for women to 
find employment in certain job classifications "where women 
have not been traditionally employed in significant numbers." 
I d., at 51. 11 As a result, observed the Plan, women were 
the job for which the trainees are being trained, a standard that would 
have invalidated the plan in Weber itself. 
10 In some cases, of course, the manifest imbalance may be sufficiently 
egregious to establish a prima facie case. However, as long as there is a 
manifest imbalance, an employer may adopt a plan even where the dispar-
ity is not so striking, without being required to introduce the non-statisti-
cal evidence of past discrimination that would be demanded by the "prima 
facie" standard. See, e. g., Teamsters v. United States , 431 U. S. 324, 339 
(1977) (statistics in pattern and practice case supplemented by testimony 
regarding employment practices). Of course, when there is sufficient evi-
dence to meet the more stringent "prima facie" standard, be it statistical, 
non-statistical, or a combination of the two, the employer is free to adopt 
an affirmative action plan. 
11 For instance, the description of the Skilled Craft Worker category, in 
which the road dispatcher position is located, is as follows: 
"Occupations in which workers perform jobs which require special man-
ual skill and a thorough and comprehensive knowledge of the process in-
volved in the work which is acquired through on-the-job training and 
experience or through apprenticeship or other formal training programs. 
Includes: mechanics and repairmen; electricians, heavy equipment oper-
ators, stationary engineers, skilled machining occupations, carpenters, 
compositors and typesetters and kindred workers." App. 108. 
As the Court of Appeals said in its decision below, "A plethora of proof is 
hardly necessary to show that women are generally underrepresented in 
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concentrated in traditionally female jobs in the Agency, and 
represented a lower percentage in other job classifications 
than would be expected if such traditional segregation had 
not occurred. Specifically, 9 of the 10 Para-Professionals 
and 110 of the 145 Office and Clerical Workers were women. 
By contrast, women were only 2 of the 28 Officials and 
Administrators, 5 of the 58 Professionals, 12 of the 124 
Technicians, none of the Skilled Craft Workers, and 1-who 
was Joyce-of the 110 Road Maintenance Workers. I d., at 
51-52. The Plan sought to remedy these imbalances through 
"hiring, training and promotion of . . . women throughout the 
Agency in all major job classifications where they are under-
represented." I d. , at 43. 
As an initial matter, the Agency adopted as a benchmark 
for measuring progress in eliminating underrepresentation 
the long-term goal of a work force that mirrored in its major 
job classifications the percentage of women in the area labor 
market. 12 Even as it did so, however, the Agency acknowl-
edged that such a figure could not by itself necessarily justify 
taking into account the sex of applicants for positions in all 
job categories. For positions requiring specialized training 
and experience, the Plan observed that the number of minor-
ities and women "who possess the qualifications required for 
entry into such job classifications is limited." I d., at 56. 
The Plan therefore directed that annual short-term goals be 
formulated that would provide a more realistic indication of 
the degree to which sex should be taken into account in filling 
particular positions. I d., at 61-64. The Plan stressed that 
such goals "should not be construed as 'quotas' that must be 
met," but as reasonable aspirations in correcting the imbal-
such positions and that strong social pressures weigh against their partici-
pation." 748 F. 2d, at 1313. 
12 Because of the employment decision at issue in this case, our discus-
sion henceforth refers primarily to the Plan's provisions to remedy the un-
derrepresentation of women. Our analysis could apply as well, however, 
to the provisions of the plan pertaining to minorities. 
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ance in the Agency's work force. I d., at 64. These goals 
we~e to take into account factors such as "turnover, layoffs, 
lateral transfers, new job openings, retirements and avail-
ability of minorities, women and handicapped persons in the 
area work force who possess the desired qualifications or po-
tential for placement." Ibid. The Plan specifically directed 
that, in establishing such goals, the Agency work with the 
County Planning Department and other sources in attempt-
ing to compile data on · the percentage of minorities and 
women in the local labor force that were actually working in 
the job classifications comprising the Agency work force. 
I d., at 63-64. From the outset, therefore, the Plan sought 
annually to develop even more refined measures of the un-
derrepresentation in each job category that required 
attention. 
As the Agency Plan recognized, women were most egre-
giously underrepresented in the Skilled Craft job category, 
since none of the 238 positions was occupied by a woman. In 
mid-1980, when Joyce was selected for the road dispatcher 
position, the Agency was still in the process of refining its 
short-term goals for Skilled Craft Workers in accordance 
with the directive of the Plan. This process did not reach 
fruition until1982, when the Agency established a short-term 
goal for that year of three women for the 55 expected open-
ings in that job category-a modest goal of about 6% for that 
category. 
We reject petitioner's argument that, since only the long-
term goal was in place for Skilled Craft positions at the time 
of Joyce's promotion, it was inappropriate for the Director to 
take into account affirmative action considerations in filling 
the road dispatcher position. The Agency's Plan emphasized 
that the long-term goals were not to be taken as guides for 
actual hiring decisions, but that supervisors were to consider 
a host of practical factors in seeking to meet affirmative ac-
tion objectives, including the fact that in some job categories 
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women were not qualified in numbers comparable to their 
representation in the labor force. 
By contrast, had the Plan simply calculated imbalances in 
all categories according to the proportion of women in the 
area labor pool, and then directed that hiring be governed 
solely by those figures, its validity fairly could be called into 
question. This is because analysis of a more specialized 
labor pool normally is necessary in determining underrepre-
sentation in some positions. If a plan failed to take distinc-
tions in qualifications into account in providing guidance for 
actual employment decisions, it would dictate mere blind hir-
ing by the numbers , for it would hold supervisors to "achieve-
ment of a particular percentage of minority employment or 
membership ... regardless of circumstances such as eco-
nomic conditions or the number of qualified minority appli-
cants . .. " Sheet Metal Workers' v. EEOC, 478 U. S. --
(1986) (JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring i,n part and dissenting 
in part). 
The Agency's Plan emphatically did not authorize such 
blind hiring. It expressly directed that numerous factors be 
taken into account in making hiring decisions, including spe-
cifically the qualifications of female applicants for particular 
jobs. Thus, despite the fact that no precise short-term goal 
was yet in place for the Skilled Craft category in mid-1980, 
the Agency's management nevertheless had been clearly in-
structed that they were not to hire solely by reference to 
statistics. The fact that only the long-term goal had been es-
tablished for this category posed no danger that personnel 
decisions would be made by reflexive adherence to a numeri-
cal standard. 
Furthermore, in considering the candidates for the road 
dispatcher position in 1980, the Agency hardly needed to rely 
on a refined short-term goal to realize that it had a significant 
problem of underrepresentation that required attention. 
Given the obvious imbalance in the Skilled Craft category, 
and given the Agency's commitment to eliminating such im-
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balances, it was plainly not unreasonable for the Agency to 
determine that it was appropriate to consider as one factor 
the sex of Ms. Joyce in making its decision. 13 The promotion 
of Joyce thus satisfies the first requirement enunciated in 
Weber, since it was undertaken to further an affirmative ac-
tion plan designed to eliminate Agency work force imbalances 
in traditionally segregated job categories. 
We next consider whether the Agency Plan unnecessarily 
trammeled the rights of male employees or created an abso-
lute bar to their advancement. In contrast to the plan in 
Weber, which provided that 50% of the positions in the craft 
training program were exclusively for blacks, and to the con-
sent decree upheld last term in Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 
U. S. -- (1986), which required the promotion of specific 
numbers of minorities, the Plan sets aside no positions for 
women. The Plan expressly states that "[t]he 'goals' estab-
lished for each Division should not be construed as 'quotas' 
that must be met." App. 64. Rather, the Plan merely au-
thorizes that consideration be given to affirmative action con-
cerns when evaluating qualified applicants. As the Agency 
Director testified, the sex of Joyce was but one of numerous 
factors he took into acount in arriving at his decision. Tr. 
68. The Plan thus resembles the "Harvard Plan" approv-
ingly noted by JUSTICE POWELL in University of California 
Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 316-319 (1978), which con-
siders race along with other criteria in determining admission 
to the college. As JusTICE POWELL observed, "In such an 
admissions program, race or ethnic background may be 
deemed a 'plus' in a particular applicant's file, yet it does not 
'
3 In addition, the Agency was mindful of the importance of finally hiring 
a woman in a job category that had formerly been all-male. The Director 
testified that, while the promotion of Joyce "made a small dent, for sure, in 
the numbers, " nonetheless "philosophically it made a larger impact in that 
it probably has encouraged other females and minorities to look at the pos-
sibility of so-called 'non-traditional' jobs as areas where they and the 
agency both have samples of a success story." Tr. 64. 
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insulate the individual from comparison with all other candi-
dates for the available seats." I d., at 317. Similarly, the 
Agency Plan requires women to compete with all other quali-
fied applicants. No persons are automatically excluded from 
consideration; all are able to have their qualifications 
weighed against those of other applicants. 
In addition, petitioner had no absolute entitlement to the 
road dispatcher position. Seven of the applicants were clas-
sified as qualified and eligible, and the Agency Director was 
authorized to promote any of the seven. Thus, denial of the 
promotion unsettled no legitimate firmly rooted expectation 
on the part of the petitioner. Furthermore, while the peti-
tioner in this case was denied a promotion, he retained his 
employment with the Agency, at the same salary and with 
the same seniority, and remained eligible for other 
promotions. 14 • 
Finally, the Agency's Plan was intended to attain a bal-
anced work · force, not to maintain one. The Plan contains 
ten references to the Agency's desire to "attain" such a bal-
ance, but no reference whatsoever to a goal of maintaining it. 
The Director testified that, while the "broader goal" of af-
firmative action, defined as "the desire to hire, to promote, to 
give opportunity and training on an equitable, non-discrimi-
natory basis," is something that is "a permanent part" of"the 
Agency's operating philosophy," that broader goal "is di-
"Furthermore, from 1978 to 1982 Skilled Craft jobs in the Agency in-
creased from 238 to 349. The Agency's personnel figures indicate that the 
Agency fully expected most of these positions to be filled by men. Of the 
111 new Skilled Craft jobs during this period, 105, or almost 95%, went to 
men. As previously noted, the Agency's 1982 Plan set a goal of hiring only 
three women out of the 55 new Skilled Craft positions projected for that 
year, a figure of about 6%. While this degree of employment expansion by 
an employer is by no means essential to a plan's validity, it underscores the 
fact that the Plan in this case in no way significantly restricts the employ-
ment prospects of such persons. Illustrative of this is the fact that an ad-
ditional road dispatcher position was created in 1983, and petitioner was 
awarded the job. Brief for Respondent Transportation Agency 36, n. 35. 
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vorced, if you will, from specific numbers or percentages." 
Tr. 48-49. 
The Agency acknowledged the difficulties that it would 
confront in remedying the imbalance in its work force, and 
anticipated only gradual increases in the representation of 
minorities and women. 15 It is thus unsurprising that the 
Plan contains no explicit end date, for the Agency's flexible, 
case-by-case approach was not expected to yield success in a 
brief period of time. Express assurance that a program is 
only temporary may be necessary if the program actually 
sets aside positions according to specific numbers. See, 
e. g., Firefighters, supra, at-- (four-year duration for con-
sent decree providing for promotion of particular number of 
minorities); Weber, 443 U. S., at 199 (plan requiring that 
blacks constitute 50% of new trainees in effect until percent-
age of employer work force equal to percentage in local labor 
force). This is necessary both to minimize the effect of the 
program on other employees, and to ensure that the plan's 
goals "[are] not being used simply to achieve and maintain 
.. . balance, but rather as a benchmark against which" the 
employer may measure its progress in eliminating the under-
represention of minorities and women. Sheet Metal Work-
ers, supra, at--. In this case, however, substantial evi-
dence shows that the Agency has sought to take a moderate , 
'
6 As the Agency Plan stated, after noting the limited number of minor-
ities and women qualified in certain categories, as well as other difficulties 
in remedying underrepresentation: 
"As indicated by the above factors, it will be much easier to attain the 
Agency's employment goals in some job categories than in others. It is 
particularly evident that it will be extremely difficult to significantly 
increase the representation of women in technical and skilled craft job 
classifications where they have traditionally been greatly underrepre-
sented. Similarly, only gradual increases in the representation of women, 
minorities or handicapped persons in management and professional posi-
tions can realistically be expected due to the low turnover that exists in 
these positions and the small numbers of persons who can be expected to 
compete for available openings. " App. 58. 
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gradual approach to eliminating the imbalance in its work 
force , one which establishes realistic guidance for employ-
ment decisions, and which visits minimal intrusion on the 
legitimate expectations of other employees. Given this fact, 
as well as the Agency's express commitment to "attain" a bal-
anced work force, there is ample assurance that the Agency 
does not seek to use its Plan to maintain a permanent racial 
and sexual balance. 
III 
In evaluating the compliance of an affirmative action plan 
with Title VII's prohibition on discrimination, we must be 
mindful of "this Court's and Congress' consistent emphasis on 
'the value of voluntary efforts to further the objectives of the 
law."' Wygant, 476 U. S., at-- (JUSTICE O'CONNOR, con-
curring in part and concurring in judgment) (quoting Bakke, 
supra, at 364). The Agency in the case before us has under-
taken such a voluntary effort, and has done so in full recogni-
tion of both the difficulties and the potential for intrusion on 
males and non-minorities. The Agency has identified a con-
spicuous imbalance in job categories traditionally segregated 
by race and sex. It has made clear from the outset, how-
ever, that employment decisions may not be justified solely 
by reference to this imbalance, but must rest on a multitude 
of practical, realistic factors. It has therefore committed it-
self to annual adjustment of goals so as to provide a reason-
able guide for actual hiring and promotion decisions. The 
Agency earmarks no positions for anyone; sex is but one of 
several factors that may be taken into account in evaluating 
qualified applicants for a position. 16 As both the Plan's lan-
16 The dissent predicts that today's decision will loose a flood of "less 
qualified" minorities and women upon the workforce, as employers seek to 
forestall possible Title VII liability. Post , at -. The first problem 
with this projection is that it is by no means certain that employers could in 
every case necessarily avoid liability for discrimination merely by adopting 
an affirmative action plan. Indeed, our unwillingness to require an admis-
sion of discrimination as the price of adopting a plan has been premised on 
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guage and its manner of operation attest, the Agency has no 
intention of establishing a work force whose permanent com-
position is dictated by rigid numerical standards. 
We therefore hold that the Agency appropriately took into 
account as one factor the sex of Diane Joyce in determining 
that she should be promoted to the road dispatcher position. 
The decision to do so was made pursuant to an affirmative ac-
tion plan that represents a moderate, flexible, case-by-case 
approach to effecting a gradual improvement in the represen-
tation of minorities and women in the Agency's work force. 
Such a plan is fully consistent with Title VII, for it embodies 
the contribution that voluntary employer action can make in 
eliminating the vestiges of discrimination in the workplace. 
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
concern that the potential liability to which such an admission would ex-
pose an employer would serve as a disincentive for creating an affirmative 
action program. See supra, n. 6. 
A second , and more fundamental, problem with the dissent's speculation 
is that it ignores the fact that 
"[i]t is a standard tenet of personnel administration that there is rarely a 
single, 'best qualified' person for a job. An effective personnel system will 
bring before the selecting official several fully-qualified candidates who 
each may possess different attributes which recommend them for selection. 
Especially where the job is an unexceptional, middle-level craft position, 
without the need for unique work experience or educational attainment and 
for which several well-qualified candidates are available , final determina-
tions as to which candidate is 'best qualified' are at best subjective." Brief 
for American Society for Personnel Administration as Amicus Curiae 9. 
This case provides an example of precisely this point. Any differences 
in qualifications between Johnson and Joyce were minimal, to say the least. 
See supra, at 5-7. The selection of Joyce thus belies the dissent's conten-
tion that the beneficiaries of affirmative action programs will be those em-
ployees who are merely not "utterly unqualified." Post , at--. 
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